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Abstract
A rich class of mechanism design problems can be understood as incomplete-information
games between a principal who commits to a policy and an agent who responds, with payoffs
determined by an unknown state of the world. Traditionally, these models require strong and
often-impractical assumptions about beliefs (a common prior over the state). In this paper, we
dispense with the common prior. Instead, we consider a repeated interaction where both the
principal and the agent may learn over time from the state history. We reformulate mechanism
design as a reinforcement learning problem and develop mechanisms that attain natural bench-
marks without any assumptions on the state-generating process. Our results make use of novel
behavioral assumptions for the agent – centered around counterfactual internal regret – that
capture the spirit of rationality without relying on beliefs.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design is a branch of economic theory concerned with the design of social institutions.
It encompasses a wide range of phenomena that have historically been of interest to economists,
including, but not limited to, auctions (Myerson 1981; Vickrey 1961), matching markets (Gale and
Shapley 1962; Roth 1982), taxation (Mirrlees 1971), contracts (Ross 1973; Spence and Zeckhauser
1971), and persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011).
Despite this field’s potential, it is often unclear whether and how mechanisms derived from
economic theory can be implemented in practice. In particular, one modeling practice stands out
as a barrier to implementation: the common prior assumption. Many mechanism design problems
are only interesting in the presence of uncertainty, and this uncertainty is typically modeled as
stochasticity. The state of the world is drawn according to some distribution and, importantly, the
distribution is commonly known by the designer and all participants in the mechanism.1
This paper will dispense with the common prior assumption. In its place, we consider a model
of adversarial online learning where the principal and a single agent are learning about the state,
over time, using data. The static mechanism design problem is a Stackelberg game of incomplete
information. The principal chooses a policy 푝, the agent chooses a response 푟, nature chooses a state
푦, and payoffs are realized. In the online problem, this game is repeated 푇 times, where state 푦푡 is
revealed at the end of period 푡. The sequence of states is arbitrary and the principal’s mechanism
should perform well without prior knowledge of the sequence. The principal’s present choices can
affect the agent’s future behavior; this makes mechanism design a reinforcement learning problem
in our model.
In the absence of distributional assumptions, standard restrictions on the agent’s behavior, like
Bayesian rationality, become toothless. In its place, we define counterfactual internal regret (CIR)
and assume that the agent obtains low CIR. This is an ex post definition of rationality that includes
Bayesian rationality (with a well-calibrated prior) as a special case. We develop data-drivenmecha-
nisms that are guaranteed to perform well under our behavioral assumptions. Specifically, we prove
upper bounds on the principal’s regret from following our mechanism, relative to the single fixed
policy that performs best in hindsight. Our results take the form of reductions from the principal’s
problem to robust versions of static mechanism design with a common prior.
Running Example. Bayesian persuasion is amodel of strategic communication, due toKamenica
and Gentzkow (2011). It has received considerable attention from economists and, more recently,
algorithmic game theorists (e.g. Dughmi and Xu 2016, Cummings et al. 2020). It is a useful test
case for our framework because (a) it is interesting even with only one agent, (b) the optimal solution
varies with the agent’s beliefs, and (c) it has the potential to be widely applicable.2
1This assumption is limiting in two ways. First, mechanisms based on a common prior may not be practicable,
because they rely on knowledge that a real-world designer is unlikely to possess. Second, even if the designer knows
the distribution (resp. has beliefs), the participants may not arrive with the same knowledge (resp. share those beliefs).
2Bayesian persuasion has been used to study a wide range of topics, including recommendation systems (Mansour
et al. 2016), traffic congestion (Das et al. 2017), congested social services (Anunrojwong et al. 2020), financial stress-
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Our running example is adapted from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). A drug company
(the principal) seeks approval from a regulator (the agent) for a newly-developed drug. The state
푦 ∈ {High,Low} describes the drug’s quality. Neither the regulator nor the company know the
quality in advance. The company needs to design a clinical trial that will generate (possibly noisy)
information about the drug’s quality. Roughly, a trial 푝 specifies the probability 푝(푚, 푦) of sending
a message 푚 to the regulator, conditional on the drug quality 푦. Informally, the message describes
the outcome of the trial. After hearing the message, the regulator decides whether to approve the
drug. The regulator receives a payoff if it approves a high-quality drug or rejects a low-quality drug.
The company receives a payoff if the regulator approves, regardless of quality. Its challenge is to
design a clinical trial that convinces the regulator to approve as many drugs as possible.
To predict behavior in incomplete-information games, we need to make assumptions about how
the agents deal with uncertainty. The common prior is one such assumption. In our running exam-
ple, the common prior would specify a probability 푞 ∈ [0, 1] that the drug is high quality. Consider
the case 푞 = 1∕3. If the company does not run a trial – e.g. it recommends “approve” in every state
– the regulator would never approve, as the drug is more likely to be low quality than high quality
ex ante. If the company runs the most thorough trial possible – e.g. it recommends “approve’ if
and only if the drug is high quality – the regulator would approve with probability 1∕3. Finally,
consider the optimal trial. The optimal trial always recommends “approve” if the drug is high qual-
ity. If the drug is low quality, it recommends “approve” and “reject” with equal probability. After
hearing “approve”, the regulator’s posterior puts equal weight on both states, and so it might as well
approve. Here, the regulator approves with probability 2∕3.
OnlineMechanism Design. In our model, both the company and the regulator would be learning
about drug quality over time. New drugs arrive sequentially. For each drug, the company designs
a clinical trial and generates a message. The regulator hears the message and decides whether to
approve. Regardless of whether the drug is approved, both parties eventually learn the drug’s true
quality, and the next drug arrives. The company’s strategy, called a mechanism, maps the drug (i.e.
state) history and the approval decision (i.e. response) history to a trial for the current drug. The
regulator’s strategy, called a learning algorithm or learner, maps the drug quality history and the
trial (i.e. policy) history to an approval decision for the current drug. This model is online because
the company and regulator must make decisions while the drugs are still arriving. It is adversarial
in the sense that we impose no assumptions on the sequence of drugs, and so any results (e.g.
claiming that a mechanism performs well) must hold for all such sequences.
The company’s problem is to develop amechanism that performs as well as the best-in-hindsight
trial. That is, the company should not regret following its mechanism relative to any simple alter-
native where it picks the same trial 푝 in every period. To evaluate what would have happened under
an alternative sequence of trials, the company must take into account how the regulator’s behav-
ior would have changed. Therefore, the company faces a reinforcement learning problem and its
benchmark corresponds to the notion of policy regret in the literature on bandit learning with adap-
testing (Goldstein and Leitner 2018), and worker motivation (Ely and Szydlowski 2020).
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tive adversaries (e.g. Arora, Dekel, et al. 2012). In that setting, Arora, Dekel, et al. (2012) show
that guaranteeing sublinear (policy) regret is generally impossible.3 This fact precludes a simple
solution to the company’s problem; we must constrain the regulator’s behavior.4
The standard way to constrain the regulator/agent’s behavior – i.e. to capture “self-interest” in
the absence of a meaningful notion of ex ante optimality – is to impose upper bounds on the agent’s
regret. This will be our approach as well. We build on existing no-regret assumptions, in ways that
are intended to refine and better motivate those assumptions.
No-Regret Agents. Two notions of regret have been used historically: external and internal (or
swap) regret (ER and IR). For example, Nekipelov et al. (2015) show how ER bounds combined
with bidding data can be used to partially identify bidder valuations in a dynamic auction. Braver-
man et al. (2018) consider a dynamic pricing problem against no-ER agents.5 Their analysis is
generalized by Deng et al. (2019), who study repeated Stackelberg games of complete information.
Furthermore, the literature on no-regret learning in games has established that if agents satisfy a
no-ER (resp. no-IR) property in a repeated game, the empirical distribution of their actions will
converge to a coarse correlated equilibrium (resp. correlated equilibrium) (Blum, Hajiaghayi, et al.
2008; Foster and Vohra 1997; Hart and Mas-Colell 2001; Hartline, Syrgkanis, et al. 2015).
Both ER and IR can be thought of as “non-policy” regret, because they do not take into account
how the agent’s behavior affects the behavior of others. The justification for these regret bounds
is that (a) they are satisfied by well-known learning algorithms (see e.g. Littlestone and Warmuth
1994 for ER), and (b) they generalize optimality conditions associatedwith a stationary equilibrium.
Nonetheless, these regret bounds can be problematic. Effectively, they assume that agents are (a)
sophisticated enough to obtain low non-policy regret, but (b) not aware that their true objective
is policy regret. Keep in mind that an agent who minimizes policy regret can easily obtain high
non-policy regret, and thereby violate the regret bounds.
To avoid this problem, the principal in our model can commit to a mechanism that is nonre-
sponsive to the agent’s behavior: the policy 푝푡 depends on the state history but not on the agent’s
response history. When mechanisms are nonresponsive, non-policy regret and policy regret co-
incide for the agent. Then, bounds on the agent’s regret are permissive assumptions that allow a
wide range of sophisticated and self-interested behavior, including Bayesian rationality. Keep in
3Arora, Dekel, et al. (2012) obtain positive results when the adversary satisfies a bounded memory assumption.
Ryabko and Hutter (2008) obtain positive results under a different kind of assumption, that the environment is suffi-
ciently “forgiving” of mistakes. These papers reflect two prominent approaches in reinforcement learning: (a) restrict-
ing attention to Markov decision processes, and (b) assuming an ability to “reset” the problem (Kearns et al. 1999).
4Arora, Dinitz, et al. (2018) consider policy regret in a repeated game and use the self-interest of the adaptive
adversary to motivate behavioral restrictions. This is reminiscent of a literature on multi-agent reinforcement learning
when the state is Markovian (Buşoniu et al. 2010; Hu and Wellman 1998; Littman 1994; Uther and Veloso 2003).
Unlike these papers, we do not have the ability in our model to advise all participants simultaneously.
5In their model, the agent is “learning” an appropriate response to the principal’s pricing strategy. If the agents use
naive mean-based learners, Braverman et al. (2018) provide a mechanism that extracts the full surplus. In particular,
the agent fails to anticipate the mechanism that the principal is using. As they point out, this leads to odd behavior: the
agent may purchase goods at a price exceeding her valuation. In our setting, the agent does not face uncertainty with
respect to the mechanism; instead, she faces uncertainty with respect to the state sequence.
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mind, there is no need to resort to responsiveness if nonresponsive mechanisms tightly bound the
principal’s regret.6
Counterfactual Internal Regret. Without constraints on the agent’s behavior, an early mistake
by the principal can result in a permanent, undesirable shift in the agent’s behavior. As we will
see, this can occur when the agent behaves as if she has additional information about the state
of the world that is not accounted for in our description of the model. The agent can make the
principal’s problem infeasible if she is willing to exploit her information selectively, i.e. based on
the principal’s choice of policies. Unfortunately, neither no-ER nor no-IR assumptions can rule out
selective use of information.
Our notion of rationality requires the agent to fully and consistently exploit her information,
regardless of the principal’s chosen policies. Existing benchmarks like external and internal regret
cannot capture this requirement. To see why, it helps to consider the fable of the tortoise and the
hare. Both animals have an hour to traverse a one-mile track. For the tortoise, this requirement is
feasible and binding: finishing in time means hustling, without substantial breaks or detours. For
the hare, however, the requirement is hardly restrictive: it may stop for a break, walk rather than
run, or even run around in circles while still finishing the race in time. Benchmarks like external
or internal regret imply reasonable behavior for an uninformed agent (i.e. the tortoise). But for an
informed agent (i.e. the hare), these benchmarks are easy enough to satisfy that it may engage in
all kinds of frivolous behavior – possibly to the detriment of the principal.
The solution to our analogy is to strengthen the hare’s benchmark. If the hare has to traverse the
track in three minutes, it needs to hustle, like the tortoise. Similarly, if the agent has to obtain no-
regret with her information as additional context, this would preclude the kind of frivolous behavior
that makes the principal’s problem infeasible. Of course, setting this benchmark requires us to know
the nature and quality of the agent’s information, just as we needed to know the top speed of the
hare. The idea behind counterfactual internal regret is that we can identify the agent’s information
with her past behavior under counterfactual mechanisms. Intuitively, any information that is useful
should eventually reveal itself through variation in behavior.
MainResults. This paper considers three variations on ourmodel: onewhere the principal knows
the agent’s information, one where the agent has no private information, and one where the agent
may have private information. In each case, we propose a mechanism and bound on the principal’s
regret in terms of the agent’s counterfactual internal regret (CIR).
Our first mechanism is intended as a warmup. It requires oracle access to the agent’s informa-
tion and has poor performance in finite samples, but avoids some complications associated with
information asymmetry between the principal and agent. First, the mechanism produces a cali-
brated forecast of the state in the current period using off-the-shelf algorithms, using the oracle as
6This approach seems spiritually similar to that of Immorlica, Mao, et al. (2020), who develop mechanisms that
incentivize efficient social learning. By restricting attention to simple disclosures (i.e. unbiased subhistories), they
significantly simplify the agents’ inferential problem and can motivate a permissive notion of frequentist rationality.
Having restricted disclosure in this manner, they nonetheless design mechanisms with optimal rates of convergence.
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additional context for the forecast. Then, it chooses the worst-case optimal policy in a (hypotheti-
cal) 휖-robust version of the common prior game. In that game, the agent’s response only needs to
be 휖-approximately optimal, and the mechanism substitutes its forecast for the prior.
Theorem 1 bounds the principal’s regret under this mechanism, under some restrictions on the
stage game. Suppose there are 푛 states, 푛 policies, and 푛 responses. Fix a parameter 휖 > 0
(controlling robustness) and 훿 > 0 (controlling the fineness of a grid). Our bound is
푂(휖)
⏟ ⏟
cost of 휖-robustness
+
1
휖
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
푂(CIR)
⏟⏟⏟
agent’s regret
+ 푂̃
(
훿1−푛푛푛
2푛

푇 1∕4
)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
forecast miscalibration
+ 푂
(
훿1∕2
)
⏟⏞⏟⏞⏟
approximation error
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(1)
If the agent satisfies no-CIR, i.e. CIR → 0 as 푇 → ∞, then the principal’s regret vanishes in 푇 as
long as 휖, 훿 → 0 at the appropriate rates. Moreover, the principal’s average payoffs converge to a
natural benchmark: what he would have obtained in a stationary equilibrium of the repeated game
with a common prior (the empirical distribution conditioned on agent’s information).
Our second mechanism applies when the agent is as uninformed as the principal. This mech-
anism is identical to the first, except its forecast does not use information revealed by the learner.
We formalize “uninformedness” by assuming that the agent’s external regret is non-negative (in
conjunction with no-CIR). Theorem 2 bounds the principal’s regret under this mechanism, under
some additional restrictions on the stage game. Our bound is
푂(휖)
⏟ ⏟
cost of 휖-robustness
+
1
휖
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
푂(CIR)
⏟⏟⏟
agent’s regret
+ 푂̃
(
훿1−푛푛
푇 1∕4
)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
forecast miscalibration
+ 푂
(
훿1∕2
)
⏟⏞⏟⏞⏟
approximation error
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(2)
Compared to (1), this drops the exponential dependence on the number 푛 of policies. This is
because the principal’s forecast does not need to take into account the agent’s information, which
significantly reduces the forecast miscalibration in finite samples.
Our third mechanism applies even when the agent is more informed than the principal. Here,
we consider an “informationally robust” version of the stage game, due to Bergemann and Morris
(2013), where the agent receives a private signal from an unknown information structure. Like
before, we formulate an 휖-robust version of this game, where the agent’s response need only be 휖-
approximately optimal. Ourmechanism is identical to the second mechanism, except that it chooses
the worst-case optimal policy in the 휖-informationally-robust game instead of the 휖-robust game.
Theorem 3 bounds the principal’s regret under this mechanism, under some restrictions on the
stage game. Let 휋̂푇 denote the empirical distribution of states 푦1∶푇 . Given a common prior 휋, let
∇(휋) be the difference between the principal’s maxmin payoff and his maxmax payoff across all
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possible information structures. Roughly, our bound is
∇(휋̂푇 )
⏟ ⏟
cost of informational robustness
+ 푂(휖)
⏟ ⏟
cost of 휖-robustness
+
1
휖
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
푂(CIR)
⏟⏟⏟
agent’s regret
+ 푂̃
(
훿1−푛푛
푇 1∕4
)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
forecast miscalibration
+ 푂
(
훿1∕2
)
⏟⏞⏟⏞⏟
approximation error
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(3)
Unlike (1) and (2), the principal’s regret does not vanish as 푇 → ∞. However, it is vanishing up to
the cost of informational robustness ∇(휋̂푇 ) that would also be present under a common prior, if the
agent were more informed than the principal.
Finally, although our focus is not on computational complexity, the reader should note that the
computational tractability of our mechanisms will depend critically on our ability to solve robust
mechanism design problems under a common prior. So, while our bounds on the principal’s regret
apply to a large class of games, evaluating tractability may require a case-by-case analysis.
Additional Related Work. Within computer science, many researchers share our goal of replac-
ing prior knowledge in mechanism design with data. The literature on sample complexity in mech-
anism design allows the principal to learn the state distribution from i.i.d. samples (Balcan, Blum,
Hartline, et al. 2008; Cole and Roughgarden 2014; Morgenstern and Roughgarden 2015; Syrgkanis
2017). Here, the data arrives as a batch rather than online, there is no repeated interaction and the
question of responsiveness does not arise. However, there has also been work that applies online
learning to auction design (e.g. Daskalakis and Syrgkanis 2016; Dudík et al. 2017) and Stackelberg
security games (e.g. Balcan, Blum, Haghtalab, et al. 2015). Here, agents are either short-lived or
myopic, whereas our agent is long-lived and potentially forward-looking.
These papers can avoid the agent’s learning problem because they emphasize applicationswhere
the agent does not face uncertainty, or where truthfulness is a dominant strategy. In contrast, Cum-
mings et al. (2020) and Immorlica, Mao, et al. (2020) study problems that are closer to our own,
insofar as both the principal and the agent must learn from data. They impose behavioral assump-
tions that are suited for i.i.d. data, whereas our model generalizes to adversarial data.
Within economics, research has focused on relaxing prior knowledge, rather than replacing it
entirely. Part of the literature on robust mechanism design relaxes the common prior to some kind
of approximate agreement on the distribution (Artemov et al. 2013; Jehiel et al. 2012; Meyer-ter-
Vehn and Morris 2011; Ollár and Penta 2017; Oury and Tercieux 2012). Our approach will suggest
휖-robustness and 휖-informational-robustness as alternatives to “approximate agreement”.
Organization. Section 2 introduces the stage game and 휖-robustness. Section 3 introduces the
repeated game. Section 4 defines external, internal, and counterfactual internal regret. Section 4
presents our mechanism and regret bounds when the agent’s learner is known. As preparation for
the remaining results, section 5 introduces the stage game with private signals. Section 4 presents
our mechanism and regret bounds when the agent is uninformed. Section 4 presents our mechanism
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and regret bounds when the agent may be more informed than the principal. Section 9 concludes
with a discussion of open problems.
Appendix A applies these results to two special cases: our running example, and a principal-
agent problem. Appendix B considers the complexity of the agent’s learning problem. Appendix
C describes our forecasting algorithms in more detail. Appendix D relaxes some of the restrictions
on the stage game and generalizes our results. Appendix E collects proofs.
2 Stage Game
Our model features three participants: a male principal, a female agent, and nature. As advertised,
we are interested in a repeated interaction between these participants. To begin with, however, we
describe the stage game, which will constitute a single-round of the repeated game. In the stage
game, the principal moves first and commits to a policy 푝 ∈  . Next, the agent observes the policy
푝 and then chooses a response 푟 ∈ . Utility functions depend on the response 푟, the policy 푝, and
an unknown state of the world 푦 ∈  , chosen by nature. Formally, the agent’s utility function is
푈 ∶  ×  ×  → [0, 1] while the principal’s utility function is 푉 ∶  ×  ×  → [0, 1].
Assumption 1 (Regularity). We impose the following regularity conditions.
1. The state space  is finite.
2. The response space is a compact space with metric 푑.
3. The policy space  is a compact space with metric 푑 .
4. The utility 푈 is equi-Lipschitz continuous in (푟, 푝) for Lipschitz constants 퐾푈

and 퐾푈

, i.e.
∀푦 ∈  ∶ |푈 (푟, 푝, 푦) − 푈 (푟̃, 푝̃, 푦)| ≤ 퐾푈

푑(푟, 푟̃) +퐾
푈

푑 (푝, 푝̃)
5. The utility 푉 is equi-Lipschitz continuous in (푟, 푝) for Lipschitz constants 퐾푉

and 퐾푉

, i.e.
∀푦 ∈  ∶ |푉 (푟, 푝, 푦) − 푉 (푟̃, 푝̃, 푦)| ≤ 퐾푉

푑(푟, 푟̃) +퐾
푉

푑(푝, 푝̃)
Later on, we will use covers to convert infinite action spaces into discrete approximations. For
example, our running example involved an infinite policy space.
Definition 1 (Covers). Let  be a metric space with metric 푑 . Generally, lower case letters 푥
denote elements of  while upper case letters 푋 denote subsets.
1. Fix 훿 > 0. Let the partition  be a 훿 cover of  . That is, for every set 푋 ∈ 푋 , any two
elements 푥, 푥̃ ∈ 푋 must be within distance 훿 of one another, i.e. 푑 (푥, 푥̃) < 훿 .
2. To reduce notation, we also let  denote a discretized subset of  . That is, for each set
푋 ∈  , choose a unique 푥 ∈ 푋 to represent 푋. In that case, we say 푥 ∈  .
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3. Let 푥 ∈  and 푥̃ ∈  . We say that 푥̃ is the discretization of 푥 if 푥, 푥̃ belong to the same
subset푋 ∈  .
We will refer to covers  of the policy space (with metric 푑),  of the response space
(with metric 푑), and Δ() of the state distributions Δ() (with the 푙1 metric).
7 Of course, if the
underlying set  is finite to begin with, we can simply set 훿 = 0 and let  =  .
The stage game plays an important role in our analysis. Two of our results (theorems 1 and 2) are
best understood as reducing the online mechanism design problem to the simpler task of finding a
“locally-robust” policy in the stage game. In the locally-robust problem, we maintain the traditional
common prior assumption: that is, the state 푦 is drawn from a commonly known distribution 휋.
However, we relax the assumption that the agent maximizes her expected utility E푦∼휋[푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)].
Instead, she chooses a response (or a distribution 휇 over responses) that guarantees her an expected
utility that is within an additive constant 휖 of the optimum. Since this assumption only partially
identifies the agent’s behavior, the principal’s utility can take on a range of values. The principal’s
worst-case utility from following policy 푝 is described by the function
훼푝(휋, 휖) = min
휇∈Δ()
E푦∼휋
[
E푟∼휇[푉 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]
s.t. max
푟̃∈
E푦∼휋[푈 (푟̃, 푝, 푦)] − E푦∼휋
[
E푟∼휇[푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]
≤ 휖
and his best-case utility is described by
훽푝(휋, 휖) = max
휇∈Δ()
E푦∼휋
[
E푟∼휇[푉 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]
s.t. max
푟̃∈
E푦∼휋[푈 (푟̃, 푝, 푦)] − E푦∼휋
[
E푟∼휇[푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]
≤ 휖
The worst-case optimal (or 휖-robust) policy, defined below, is one of two main ingredients in our
proposed mechanisms (the other is a calibrated forecasting algorithm).
Definition 2 (휖-Robustness). The 휖-robust policy is worst-case optimal over all response distribu-
tions 휇 that achieve at least the agent’s optimal expected utility minus 휖. Formally, policy is
푝∗(휋, 휖) ∈ argmax
푝∈
훼푝(휋, 휖)
Definition 3 (Cost of 휖-Robustness). Fix a distribution 휋 and parameter 휖 > 0. The cost of 휖-
robustness is the distance between the principal’s best-case utility (under the best-case optimal
policy) and worst-case utility (under the worst-case optimal policy). Formally,
Δ(휋, 휖) = max
푝∈
훽푝(휋, 휖) − 훼푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 휖)
The cost of 휖-robustness will be a key variable in our upper bounds on the principal’s regret in
the repeated game. It will be convenient to assume that this cost is growing at most linearly in 휖,
although this assumption is not really necessary (see appendix D).
Assumption 2. For any distribution 휋, Δ(휋, 휖) = 푂(휖).
7Note that  ,, Δ() are all compact. Therefore, we can always construct a finite cover.
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Finally, the following lemma will be important to our results. Suppose that the principal mis-
judges the agent. Instead of choosing a response that achieves at least her optimal expected utility
minus 휖, the agent only achieves her optimal expected utility minus 휖 + 휖̃, for 휖̃ > 0. Nonetheless,
if the principal uses the 휖-robust policy, his utility degrades smoothly in the residual 휖̃.
Lemma 1. Assume regularity (assumption 1). For any distribution 휋, policy 푝, and constants
휖, 휖̃ > 0, the principal’s worst-case and best-case utilities satisfy
훼푝(휋, 휖 + 휖̃) ≥ 훼푝(휋, 휖) −
휖̃
휖
and 훽푝(휋, 휖 + 휖̃) ≤ 훽푝(휋, 휖) +
휖̃
휖
Appendix A describes two well-known special cases of our model: Bayesian persuasion and
the principal-agent problem. For each case, we provide a simple example, check that the example
satisfies all relevant assumptions, and evaluate our results. In that sense, these examples serve as
sanity checks for the rest of the paper, which involves assumptions and solutions that are sometimes
rather abstract.
3 Repeated Game
In the repeated game, the stage game is repeated 푇 times. In period 푡, the principal chooses policy
푝푡, the agent chooses response 푟푡, and nature chooses the state 푦푡. At the end of period 푡, the state
푦푡 is revealed to both the principal and the agent.
The agent’s repeated game strategy (henceforth, learner 퐿) maps the state history 푦1∶푡−1, the
response history 푟1∶푡−1, the policy history 푝1∶푡−1, and the current policy 푝푡 to a distribution 휇푡 over
responses. Formally, the response distribution in the 푡th period is given by8
퐿푡 ∶ 
푡−1 ×푡−1 ×  푡 → Δ()
The principal’s repeated game strategy (henceforth, mechanism 휎) maps the state history 푦1∶푡−1,
the response history 푟1∶푡−1, and the policy history 푝1∶푡−1 to a distribution 휈푡 over policies. Formally,
the policy distribution in the 푡th period is given by
휎푡 ∶ 
푡−1 ×푡−1 ×  푡−1 → Δ()
Our goal is to design a mechanism 휎∗ that the principal would not regret using, relative to
a finite set of alternative mechanisms. Regret – which we define momentarily – measures the
gap in performance between 휎∗ and the alternative mechanism 휎 that performed best in hindsight,
given the realized sequence of states 푦1∶푇 . We consider a simple set of alternative mechanisms,
corresponding to some finite set of fixed policies 0 ⊆  that the principal wishes to consider.
9
8The fact that the response distribution 휇푡 may depend on realized response history 푟1∶푡−1 allows the learner to
introduce correlation between responses across time, if desired.
9Many of our results and definitions can be adapted to any finite set of nonresponsive mechanisms.
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Formally, by a fixed policy 푝, we mean a constant mechanism 휎푝 that selects the same policy
휎
푝
푡 (푦1∶푡−1, 푟1∶푡−1, 푝1∶푡−1) = 푝
in all periods 푡 and for all histories.
To define the principal’s regret, we need notation for the agent’s behavior under the proposed
mechanism 휎∗, as well as under the counterfactual mechanisms 휎푝. Fix the state sequence 푦1∶푇 . Let
휇∗
푡
describe the agent’s behavior under 휎∗, i.e.
휇∗
푡
= 퐿푡
(
푦1∶푡−1, 푟
∗
1∶푡−1
, 푝∗
1∶푡
)
given the realized history of responses 푟∗
1∶푡−1
and policies 푝∗
1∶푡
under 휎∗. Let 휇푝푡 describes the agent’s
behavior under 휎푝, i.e.
휇
푝
푡 = 퐿푡(푦1∶푡−1, 푟
푝
1∶푡−1
, (푝,… , 푝
⏟⏟⏟
t times
))
given the realized history of responses 푟푝
1∶푡−1
under 휎푝.
Definition 4 (Principal’s Regret). The principal’s regret relative to the best-in-hindsight fixed policy
푝 ∈ 0 is
PR(퐿, 푦1∶푇 ) = sup
푝∈0
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
(
E푟∼휇푝푡
[
푉 (푟, 푝, 푦푡)
]
− E푟∼휇∗푡
[
푉 (푟, 휎∗(푦1∶푡−1, 푟
∗
1∶푡−1
, 푝1∶푡−1), 푦푡)
])
The mechanism 휎∗ satisfies no-regret if the principal’s regret is 표(1), i.e. it vanishes as 푇 → ∞.
Recall that the no-regret mechanism design problem is infeasible without further assumptions on
the learner 퐿. The following proposition formalizes this simple observation.
Proposition 1 (Impossibility Result for Unrestricted Learners). In our running example, for every
mechanism 휎∗, there exists a learner 퐿 along with a state sequence 푦1∶∞ such that the principal’s
regret does not vanish, i.e.
lim
푇→∞
PR(퐿, 푦1∶푇 ) > 0
4 Behavioral Assumptions
In this section, we develop a restriction on the learner 퐿 that captures “rational” behavior by the
agent, without requiring assumptions on the state sequence 푦1∶푇 . In particular, we build on no-regret
assumptions pioneered in the literature on learning in games.
In online learning, regret measures how much better or worse off the agent would have been
had she followed the best-in-hindsight “simple” strategy instead of her learner. Different notions of
regret correspond to different definitions of simplicity. All of the regret notions used in this paper
will be special cases of contextual regret, defined as follows. Given a sequence 푧1∶푇 of variables in
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some arbitrary set , contextual regret considers a strategy “simple” if, for any two periods 푡 and
휏, sharing the same context 푧푡 = 푧휏 implies taking the same response 푟푡 ≠ 푟휏 .
Definition 5. Given a sequence 푧1∶푇 of covariates, the agent’s contextual regret relative to a best-
in-hindsight modification rule ℎ ∶ →  is
CR(푝1∶푇 , 푦1∶푇 ) = max
ℎ
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
(
푈 (ℎ(푧푡), 푝푡, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡)
)
Note that, unlike our definition of the principal’s regret, the agent’s contextual regret does not
take into account how changes in her past behavior would have also affected the principal’s behavior.
This omission is justified when the mechanism is nonresponsive.
Definition 6 (Responsiveness). A mechanism 휎 is nonresponsive if
휎푡(푦1∶푡−1, 푟1∶푡−1, 푝1∶푡−1) = 휎푡(푦1∶푡−1, 푟̃1∶푡−1, 푝1∶푡−1)
for any period 푡, state history 푦1∶푡−1, policy history 푝1∶푡−1, and response histories 푟1∶푡−1, 푟̃1∶푡−1.
Our mechanisms will be nonresponsive. This is a design choice, not an assumption. In re-
stricting attention to nonresponsive mechanisms, we simplify the agent’s problem and make our
behavioral assumptions more credible. If our mechanisms were responsive, non-myopic agents
would not necessarily satisfy no-regret as defined above. For example, an agent might decide to
forgo an otherwise-optimal response if she believes said response would trigger an undesirable
policy by the principal going forward.10 This behavior would be perfectly reasonable but could
cause the agent to accumulate regret. Finally, as it turns out, even nonresponsive mechanisms can
guarantee vanishing principal’s regret in two of the scenarios we study (sections 5 and 7). In these
scenarios, there is limited room for responsive mechanisms to improve our guarantees.
In the remainder of this section, we define three special cases of contextual regret: external
regret (ER), internal regret (IR), and counterfactual internal regret (CIR).
4.1 External Regret
In our model, external regret is contextual regret where the policy 푝푡 is the context in period 푡. That
is, no-ER requires the agent to perform as well as the best-in-hindsight mapping from policies 푝푡
to responses 푟푡. Now, why should external regret include the policy as context? Because our stage
game is an extensive form. A strategy in the stage game is not a response; it is a function from the
observed policy to a response. Our definition of external regret compares the agent’s performance
to the best-in-hindsight strategy in the stage game.11
10For instance, in models of repeated sales, a buyermay refuse to purchase a good at a reasonable price if she believes
that holding out will cause the seller to reduce prices in the future (Devanur et al. 2019; Immorlica, Lucier, et al. 2017).
11Suppose that, instead, we compared the agent’s performance to the best-in-hindsight response 푟 ∈ . Defining
external regret in this way would confound variation in policies with variation in the state, and could lead to odd
11
An immediate difficulty with defining ER is that the set  may be continuous.12 For instance,
this is true in our running example. To ensure that the agent’s learning problem is feasible in that
case, we allow the agent to group together nearby policies according to the cover  (defined in
section 2), and consider regret with respect to this coarser context. Of course, when the policy
space  is finite, there is no need for this, and we can set  =  .
Definition 7 (External Regret). The agent’s external regret (ER) relative to the best-in-hindsight
modification rule ℎ ∶  →  is
ER(푝1∶푇 , 푦1∶푇 ) = max
ℎ
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
(
푈 (ℎ(푝푡), 푝푡, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡)
)
Note the slight abuse of notation. By ℎ(푝푡), we mean ℎ(푃푡)where 푃푡 is the unique set in the partition
 that contains 푝푡.
Although common in the literature (e.g. Nekipelov et al. 2015, Braverman et al. 2018), no-
ER assumptions are insufficient for our problem. They do not circumvent the impossibility result
(proposition 1) that motivated us to restrict the agent’s behavior in the first place. In particular, this
is because they fail to rule out certain pathological behaviors. Because these pathological behaviors
are clearly not in the agent’s best interest, we also conclude that no-ER fails to rule out “irrational”
behavior and is therefore not a good definition of “rationality”. The following proposition (and its
proof) clarifies the issue.
Proposition 2 (Impossibility Result for No-ER Learners). In our running example, for every mech-
anism 휎∗, there exists a learner 퐿 that guarantees no-ER on all state/policy sequences, i.e.
lim
푇→∞
sup
푝̃1∶푇 ,푦̃1∶푇
E퐿
[
ER(푝̃1∶푇 , 푦̃1∶푇 )
]
= 0
along with a state sequence 푦1∶∞ such that the principal’s regret does not vanish, i.e.
lim
푇→∞
PR(퐿, 푦1∶푇 ) > 0
4.2 Internal and Counterfactual Internal Regret
Before defining CIR, we provide a brief intuition: what went wrong with external regret? Recall the
tortoise and hare analogy in the introduction. For a behavioral assumption to rule out pathological
behaviors, it may have to adapt to the information of the agent (or the speed of the animal).
behavior. For example, consider the“mean-based” learner in Braverman et al. (2018), which never deviates far from
the response that maximizes the agent’s empirical utility. In that paper, the learner engages in odd behavior, like
spending more than the agent’s valuation.
Our definition is more similar to that of Hartline, Johnsen, et al. (2019), where agents following a dashboard provided
by themechanismwill best respond to an allocation rule given the empirical value distribution, rather than best respond
to the empirical bid distribution. This way, the agent adapts sensibly to changes in the principal’s policy.
12If  is continuous, the policy 푝푡 may be unique in every period 푡 = 1,… ,∞. In that case, requiring no-ER would
be equivalent to requiring ex post optimality. That is unreasonably strong.
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What do we mean by information? Implicit in most stochastic models is the idea that the state is
fundamentally unpredictable. But there is no ex ante sense in which the deterministic sequence 푦1∶푇
is predictable or not. In particular, the agent may behave as if she possesses “private information”
about the sequence of states that goes beyond the “public information” inherent in the description of
themodel. In practice, the agentmay have access to data that the principal lacks, notice a pattern that
did not occur to the principal, or succeed through dumb luck. Formally, this reflects an adversary
who simultaneously chooses the state sequence 푦1∶푇 and the learner 퐿 to cause the mechanism 휎
∗
to underperform. In particular, even though the agent may not observe 푦푡 when choosing a response
푟푡, this cannot prevent the adversary from “correlating” 푟푡 and 푦푡.
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No-CIR requires the agent to consistently and fully exploit her private information. In the spirit
of revealed preference, private information is identified with her behavior across counterfactual
mechanisms. Intuitively, if the agent is able to distinguish between periods 푡, 휏 and finds it useful
to do so, then her behavior should also differ between those two periods. If her behavior under one
mechanism reveals private information, this information should also be accessible to her under a
different mechanism. This logic allows us to define a purely ex post notion of rationality that does
not refer to the agent’s beliefs or to a distribution over state sequences.
No-CIR refines no-IR, a weaker condition that was developed in the literature on calibration
(e.g. Foster and Vohra 1997). Internal regret is contextual regret where the context is the agent’s
own behavior 푟1∶푇 . To ensure that the agent’s learning problem is feasible when the response space
 is infinite, we allow the agent to group together nearby responses according to the cover , and
consider regret with respect to this coarser context. Of course, when the response space is finite,
as in our running example, there is no need for this, and we can set  = .
Definition 8 (Internal Regret). The agent’s internal regret (IR) relative to the best-in-hindsight
modification rule ℎ ∶ 푆 × 푆 →  is
IR(푝1∶푇 , 푦1∶푇 ) = max
ℎ
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
(
푈 (ℎ(푝푡, 푟푡), 푝푡, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡)
)
Like earlier, note the slight abuse of notation. By ℎ(푝푡, 푟푡), we mean ℎ(푃푡, 푅푡) where (푃푡, 푅푡) is the
unique set in the collection  ×  that contains (푝푡, 푟푡).
Counterfactual internal regret is contextual regret where the context is the concatenation of: the
policy 푝∗
푡
under the proposed mechanism 휎∗; the agent’s behavior 푟∗
1∶푇
under 휎∗; and her counter-
factual behavior 푟푝
1∶푇
under the fixed policies 푝 ∈ 0. The following definitions formalize this.
13To be clear, this “correlation” is non-causal. For example, the adversary might choose a state sequence such that
푦푡 = 1 on even periods and 푦푡 = 0 on odd periods, and a learner 퐿 such that 푟푡 = 1 on even periods and 푟푡 = 0 on
odd periods. Empirically-speaking, there would be a correlation between the states and the responses. However, if we
subsequently changed the value of state 푦푡 in some period 푡, this would not affect the response 푟푡, because the state is
not observed and cannot affect the output of the learner 퐿. That is, there is no causal relationship between 푟푡 and 푦푡.
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Definition 9 (Information). Let the information partition be
 = 푆
⏟ ⏟
policy 푝∗푡
× 푆
⏟ ⏟
response 푟∗푡
×
(
푆
)|0|
⏟⏞⏟⏞⏟
responses 푟
푝
푡 for 푝 ∈ 0
and let the information 퐼푡 in period 푡 be the unique set in  that satisfies
퐼푡 ∋
(
푝∗
푡
, 푟∗
푡
, (푟
푝
푡 )푝∈0
)
Note that, by definition, the same information 퐼푡 is available to the agent regardless of whether
the principal follows our mechanism 휎∗ or deviates to some fixed policy 푝 ∈ 0. Intuitively, the
principal’s choice of mechanism should not affect what information the agent has available.
Definition 10 (Counterfactual Internal Regret). The agent’s counterfactual internal regret (CIR)
relative to the best-in-hindsight modification rule ℎ ∶ 푆 × 푆
|0|+1

→  is
CIR(푝1∶푇 , 푦1∶푇 ) = max
ℎ
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
(
푈 (ℎ(퐼푡), 푝푡, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡)
)
The discussion in the proof of proposition 2 clarifies how no-CIR rules out the kinds of patho-
logical or irrational behavior that no-ER fails to rule out. In the next section, we will see the crucial
role that no-CIR plays in our proving our bounds on the principal’s regret. The essential prop-
erty is that, conditional on information 퐼푡, the agent chooses a roughly constant response that is
approximately best-in-hindsight for whichever mechanism the principal is considering.
5 Mechanism for an Informed Principal
Our first result should be viewed as pedagogical. It bounds the principal’s regret under a mechanism
that requires oracle access to the agent’s learner. This requirement is unrealistic and will be removed
in sections 5 and 6. Likewise, the bound itself will feature an exponential dependence on the size
of the policy space. This dependence will also be removed in later sections.
Definition 11 (Information Oracle). The information oracle Ω푡 ∶  →  specifies the information
퐼푡 that the learner 퐿 would generate in period 푡 given any policy 푝푡 ∈  and the realized history.
This case is a convenient starting point because it avoids the bulk of the information asymmetries
between the principal and the agent that our later results need to address. That follows from the
fact that any private information generated by the learner can be anticipated by the principal with
access to the information oracle. This case is also a convenient point of departure from the common
prior assumption because it permits a wider range of agent behavior without relaxing the principal’s
knowledge of said behavior. To be clear, under a common prior, the fact that the principal knows
the agent’s prior means that he also has precise knowledge of the agent’s learner. In addition, since
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the agent is Bayesian, the agent does not find it beneficial to randomize and her learner will typically
be deterministic. Essentially, the common prior provides an information oracle for free.
Mechanism 1. Let the distribution 휋푡 be a forecast of the state 푦푡 generated by a calibrated fore-
casting algorithm that uses the agent’s information as context.
• Our forecasting algorithm applies a generic no-internal-regret algorithm due to Blum and
Mansour (2007) in an auxilliary learning problem where the action space consists of dis-
cretized forecasts 휋 ∈ Δ() and the loss function is the negated quadratic scoring rule 푆. In
each period, the algorithm makes a prediction 휋푡 and incurs loss −푆(휋푡, 푦푡). Further details
as well as rates of convergence are in appendix C.
• The context is the vector of outputs Ω(푝) of the information oracle under discretized policies
푝 ∈  . The forecasting algorithm is run separately for each context.
Fix a parameter 휖̄ > 0. In period 푡, the informed-principal mechanism 휎∗ chooses the discretization
of the 휖̄-robust policy 푝∗(휋푡, 휖̄) that treats the forecast 휋푡 as a common prior.
Before stating the theorem in full, we present the reasoning behind the result and clarify the
components of the regret bound, as well as the assumptions required. First, we require some ad-
ditional notation. Let “푡 ∈ 퐼” indicate that information 퐼 is present in period 푡, i.e. 퐼푡 = 퐼 . Let
푛퐼 =
∑푇
푡=1
1(푡 ∈ 퐼) indicate the number of periods with information 퐼 . Let 휋̂퐼 be the empirical
distribution conditioned on the agent having information 퐼 , i.e.
휋̂퐼 (푦) =
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
1(푦푡 = 푦)
We begin with a straightforward but important observation: across all periods 푡 ∈ 퐼 , the agent’s
response 푟∗
푡
is roughly constant, as are her counterfactual responses 푟푝푡 under fixed policies 푝 ∈ 0.
By regularity (1), slight variations in responses have correspondingly slight impacts on the agent’s
and principal’s utility. Suppose that these responses are exactly constant, i.e. 푟푡 = 푟퐼 . Note that
푝푡 = 푝퐼 is exactly constant as well, across these time periods, for all constant mechanisms 휎
푝 as
well as the proposed mechanism 휎∗, which uses discretized policies. With everything constant, the
principal’s average utility across context 퐼 takes on a familiar form:
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦푡) = E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푉 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
Similarly, the agent’s average utility is
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦푡) = E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
Essentially, within each context 퐼 , we have recreated the stage game with common prior 휋̂퐼 . The
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agent accumulates regret
휖퐼 = max
푟̃
E푦∼휋̂퐼 [푈 (푟̃, 푝, 푦)] − E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푈 (푟퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]
Under mechanism 1, the principal chooses (roughly) the 휖̄-robust policy for the forecast 휋푡.
Suppose for the moment that the forecasts are also roughly constant for all periods 푡 ∈ 퐼 , i.e.
휋푡 = 휋퐼 . Since the forecast is calibrated and uses information 퐼푡 as context, 휋퐼 cannot be too far in
the 푙1 distance from 휋̂퐼 (this is essentially the definition of calibration, and follows from results in
appendix C). It follows from regularity that the 휖̄-robust policy for 휋퐼 is nearly 휖̄-robust for 휋̂퐼 .
At this point, the principal has (roughly) applied the 휖̄-robust policy for the empirical distribu-
tion 휋̂퐼 , to an agent that obtains regret 휖퐼 . In that sense, the principal has misjudged the agent’s
capacity to make mistakes. However, recall lemma 1: this affects the principal’s best-case and
worst-case utilities by at most 휖퐼∕휖̄. It follows that, roughly-speaking, the principal’s utility is not
much worse than the worst-case optimal utility. At the same time, it cannot be much better than the
best-case optimal utility. More precisely,
max
푝̃
훽푝̃(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
휖퐼
휖̄
≥ E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푉 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
≥ max
푝̃
훼푝̃(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
휖퐼
휖̄
(4)
By assumption 2, the difference between the upper bound and the lower bound is
푂(휖̄) + 푂
(휖퐼
휖̄
)
(5)
This pins down the principal’s utility under mechanism 1. Moreover, the upper bound in (4) also
applies to any constant mechanism 휎푝 for 푝 ∈ 0. Therefore, (5) also bounds the regret accumulated
by the principal in context 퐼 .
This brings us to our key assumption: the agent’s CIR is at most some constant 휖.
Assumption 3 (Bounded CIR). Let 푦1∶푇 be the realized state sequence and let 푝
∗
1∶푇
be the policy
sequence generated by the proposed mechanism 휎∗. There exists a constant 휖 ≥ 0 such that
휖 ≥ CIR(푦1∶푇 , 푝
∗
1∶푇
) and 휖 ≥ CIR(푦1∶푇 , 푝,… , 푝
⏟⏟⏟
푡 times
), ∀푝 ∈ 0
Remark 1. It is worth emphasizing that this bound applies only to the realized state sequence 푦1∶푇 .
That is, the agent does not need to perform well over all state sequences, and her objective need
not be worst-case regret minimization. If the agent is Bayesian, for example, she will obtain low
CIR as long as her beliefs are well-calibrated.
Since CIR is contextual regret with information 퐼푡 as context, bounded CIR ensures that
휖 ≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼휖퐼
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Combine this with our bound (5) on the agent’s regret 휖퐼 in the context of information 퐼 , and it
follows that the principal’s regret is bounded above by
푂(휖̄) + 푂
(
휖
휖̄
)
To transform this intuition into a result, we need to address an assumption made along the way:
that the forecast 휋푡 is roughly constant across all periods 푡 ∈ 퐼 . This is not necessarily true. The
adversary can choose a sequence of states 푦1∶푇 that makes the principal appear more informed than
the agent. Indeed, variation in forecasts can be interpreted as private information of the principal,
even if it is spurious. On the other hand, any variation in 휋푡 that affects the policy 푝푡 will also be
included in the agent’s information 퐼푡. What remains is variation in 휋푡 that does not affect the policy
– useless information from the principal’s perspective, but not necessarily useless to the agent. If
the principal expects the agent to exploit this information and the agent does not, this can lead to a
suboptimal policy choice.
The following assumption restricts attention to stage games where this problem does not arise;
that is, the agent’s failure to exploit information that is useless to the principal does not affect the
principal’s utility. In appendix D, we avoid this restriction by instead assuming that the principal –
using our publicly-announced mechanism – is not more informed than the agent.
Assumption 4. Let 휖 > 0. Let 휋 and 휋̃ be distributions in the stage game. If the 휖-robust policies
under 휋 and under 휋̃ are close to one another, then they are also close to the 휖-robust policy under
any convex combination of these distributions. Formally, for any 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
푑 (푝
∗(휋, 휖), 푝∗ (휆휋 + (1 − 휆)휋̃, 휖)) = 푂
(
푑 (푝
∗(휋, 휖), 푝∗(휋̃, 휖))
)
The following theorem formalizes the preceding discussion and bounds the principal’s regret
under mechanism 1.
Theorem 1. Assume regularity (assumption 1), restrictions on the stage game (assumptions 2, 4),
and 휖-bounded CIR (assumption 3). Let 휎∗ be the mechanism 1. Given access to the information
oracle, for any constant 휖̄ > 0, the principal’s expected regret E휎∗
[
PR(퐿, 푦1∶푇 )
]
is at most
푂(휖̄)
⏟ ⏟
cost of 휖̄-robustness
+
1
휖̄
⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
푂(휖)
⏟ ⏟
agent’s regret
+ 푂̃
(
푇 −1∕4
√|||Δ()||푅|(|0|+| |)∕2)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
forecast miscalibration
+푂
(
훿
1∕2
Δ()
)
+푂(훿) + 푂(훿)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
discretization error
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Remark 2. Here are a few comments on this result.
1. The bound depends on the size of the partitions  , , and Δ . However, if we define these
partitions to be as small as possible, we can replace these terms with the covering numbers
of  , , and Δ(), respectively. In that sense, our finite sample bounds will deteriorate as
one increases the complexity of the action and state spaces.
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2. Furthermore, if we define these partitions to be the smallest possible, then theorem 1 implies
that the principal’s regret vanishes if 푇 → ∞ and 휖, 휖̄, 훿Δ(), 훿 , 훿 → 0 at the appropriate
rates. It also follows from the proof that the principal’s payoffs converge to a natural bench-
mark: what he would have obtained in a stationary equilibrium of the repeated game where
it is common knowledge that 푦푡 is drawn independently from the empirical distribution 휋̂퐼푡.
Formally,
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푉 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡) −
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼 max
푝∈
훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 0)→ 0
3. Finally, note the exponential dependence on the number of alternative mechanisms |0| and
the size of the policy space cover | |. This dependence, which is not present in theorems 2
and 3, reflects the fact that the mechanism 1 uses the agent’s information 퐼푡 as context for its
forecast 휋푡. Since our bound is uniform across all learners that satisfy 휖-bounded CIR on the
realized state sequence 푦1∶푇 , it must accommodate learners that generate a lot of information,
regardless of whether that information is useful. As mentioned at the beginning of this section,
this is another reason why the “informed principal” setting seems less compelling than the
settings studied in sections 7 and 8.
6 Stage Game with Private Signals
In general, we cannot expect the principal to have access to an information oracle. Fortunately, we
can still construct mechanisms 휎∗ that obtain vanishing or bounded principal’s regret without any
knowledge of the learner. However, in order to state the relevant assumptions (sections 7 and 8)
and describe the mechanism (section 8), we need to consider scenarios where the agent has private
information that the principal lacks. This requires a brief detour. In this section, we revisit the stage
game in order to introduce terminology that reflects agent’s private information.
Suppose that the state 푦 is drawn from a known distribution 휋, but the agent has access to a
private signal 퐼 ∈  generated by the information structure 훾 .
Definition 12 (Information Structure). An information structure is a function 훾 ∶  ×  → [0, 1]
where 훾(⋅, 푦) is a probability distribution over .
The game proceeds as follows. First, nature chooses a hidden state 푦 ∼ 휋. Second, the principal
chooses a policy 푝. Third, the agent observes a signal 퐼 ∼ 훾(⋅, 푦) and chooses a response 푟퐼 . For
instance, if the agent maximizes her expected utility, her responses after signals 퐼 would be
푟퐼 ∈ argmax
푟̃퐼∈
E푦∼휋
[
E퐼∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟̃퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]]
Finally, the state 푦 is revealed and payoffs are determined.
As in section 2, suppose the agent does not necessarily maximize her expected utility. Instead,
she chooses responses 푟퐼 (or distributions휇퐼 over responses) that guarantees her an expected utility
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that is within an additive constant 휖 of the optimum. For a given information structure 훾 , the
principal’s worst-case utility from following policy 푝 is described by
훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖) = min
휇퐼∈Δ()
E푦∼휋
[
E퐼∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
E푟∼휇퐼 [푉 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]
subject to max
푟̃퐼∈
E푦∼휋
[
E퐼∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟̃퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]]
− E푦∼휋
[
E퐼∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
E푟∼휇퐼 [푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]
≤ 휖
and his best-case utility is described by
훽푝(휋, 훾, 휖) = max
휇퐼∈Δ()
E푦∼휋
[
E퐼∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
E푟∼휇퐼 [푉 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]
subject to max
푟̃퐼∈
E푦∼휋
[
E퐼∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟̃퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]]
− E푦∼휋
[
E퐼∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
E푟∼휇퐼 [푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]
≤ 휖
Note that 훼(휋, 휖), the worst-case utility in the stage game without a private signal, is equivalent to
훼(휋, 훾, 휖) when 훾 is uninformative. The same applies to 훽.
Recall that our theorem 1 could be interpreted as reducing the onlinemechanism design problem
to the simpler task of finding a 휖-robust policy in the stage game without a private signal. The same
is true of our next result, theorem 2. In contrast, theorem 3 reduces the online problem to solving for
a robust policy when the agent has a private signal generated by an unknown information structure.
This corresponds to notion of informational robustness introduced byBergemann andMorris (2013)
and applied by Bergemann, Brooks, et al. (2017), applied to our single-agent setting.
Definition 13 (휖-Informational-Robustness). The worst-case optimal (or 휖-informationally-robust)
policy for an unknown information structure 훾 is
푝†(휋, 휖) ∈ argmax
푝∈
inf
훾
훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖)
Definition 14 (Cost of 휖-Informational-Robustness). Fix a distribution휋 and parameter 휖 > 0. The
cost of 휖-informational-robustness is the distance between the principal’s best-case utility (under
the best-case optimal policy (for the best-case information structure) and worst-case utility (under
the worst-case optimal policy for the worst-case information structure). Formally,14
∇(휋, 휖) = max
푝∈
sup
훾
훽푝(휋, 훾, 휖) − max
푝∈
inf
훾
훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖)
Let ∇(휋) = ∇(휋, 0) denote the cost of informational robustness in the traditional setting where
the agent is optimizing exactly (휖 = 0). It will be convenient to assume that the cost is growing at
most linearly in 휖, although this assumption is not really necessary (see appendix D).
Assumption 5. For any distribution 휋, ∇(휋, 휖) = ∇(휋) +푂(휖).
14Why do we evaluate the cost of informational robustness under the worst-case information structure? Because the
regret guarantee that we obtain in theorem 3 applies uniformly across all learners 퐿. As we will see, different learners
will induce different empirical information structures 훾 . Our cost of informational robustness must accommodate the
worst-case information structure, which loosely corresponds to the worst-case learner.
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Finally, we verify that lemma 1 still applies in the presence of private signals.
Lemma 2. Assume regularity (assumption 1). For any distribution 휋, information structure 훾 ,
policy 푝, and constants 휖, 휖̃ > 0, the principal’s worst-case and best-case utilities satisfy
훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖 + 휖̃) ≥ 훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖) −
휖̃
휖
and 훽푝(휋, 훾, 휖 + 휖̃) ≤ 훽푝(휋, 훾, 휖) +
휖̃
휖
7 Mechanism for an Uninformed Agent
Our second result bounds the principal’s regret under a mechanism that does not require detailed
knowledge of the learner 퐿. Instead, this result assumes that the agent is not more informed than
the principal. To begin, the mechanism is as follows.
Mechanism 2. Let the distribution 휋푡 be a forecast of the state 푦푡.
• Our forecasting algorithm applies a generic no-internal-regret algorithm due to Blum and
Mansour (2007) in an auxilliary learning problem where the action space consists of dis-
cretized forecasts 휋 ∈ Δ() and the loss function is the negated quadratic scoring rule.
Fix a parameter 휖̄ > 0. In period 푡, the uninformed-agent mechanism 휎∗ chooses the discretization
of the 휖̄-robust policy 푝∗(휋푡, 휖̄) that treats the forecast 휋푡 as a common prior.
What does it mean for an agent to be uninformed? Following the intuition developed in section
4, the agent’s behavior cannot reveal an understanding of the state sequence that goes far beyond
the principal’s forecast. This can be formalized by adding a lower bound on the agent’s ER to our
upper bound on the agent’s (counterfactual) IR.15
Assumption 6 (Lower-Bounded ER). Let 푦1∶푇 be the realized state sequence and let 푝
∗
1∶푇
be the
policy sequence generated by the proposed mechanism 휎∗. There exists a constant 휖̃ ≥ 0 such that
ER(푦1∶푇 , 푝
∗
1∶푇
) ≥ −휖̃ and ER(푦1∶푇 , 푝,… , 푝
⏟⏟⏟
푡 times
) ≥ −휖̃, ∀푝 ∈ 0
While there is no a priori sense in which the deterministic sequence 푦1∶푇 is predictable or not,
this combination of bounds can be seen as an ex post definition of unpredictability. Intuitively, if an
agent fully exploits the information she reveals under the proposed mechanism 휎∗ (no-IR) without
outperforming the best use of public information (non-negative ER), her private information cannot
be particularly useful. Fully exploiting useless information generally means ignoring it.
To see this, suppose the policy 푝 is fixed and that the learner obtains non-positive IR and non-
negative ER. It is trivial to show that IR is non-negative and bounded below by ER, so it follows
15Although they study a different problem, Blum, Gunasekar, et al. (2018) also use lower bounds on ER to prove
results, exploiting the fact that exponential weights guarantees non-negative expected ER (Gofer and Mansour 2016).
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that the learner’s IR and ER both equal zero. In turn, IR and ER can only be equal when the best-
in-hindsight responses conditional on the context (i.e. the learner’s response) are the same in every
context. That is, the context is useless. To achieve zero IR, the learner’s response must equal some
best-in-hindsight response conditional on the context. If the best-in-hindsight response is unique,
this means that the learner’s response is the same in every period.
What this amounts to, essentially, is that our reasoning for theorem 1 largely applies to theo-
rem 2. Let us recall the first steps of that argument. Previously, we considered all periods 푡 ∈ 퐼
with information 퐼 as context. It followed immediately from the definition of information that the
agent’s responses 푟푡 were roughly some constant 푟퐼 . Furthermore, since the principal’s forecasts
used 퐼푡 as context, the constant policy 푝퐼 was calibrated to the empirical distribution 휋̂퐼 .
Now, our mechanism does not have access to 퐼푡 and is not calibrated to 휋̂퐼 . Instead, for every
policy context 푃 ∈ Σ , it is calibrated to the empirical distribution 휋̂푃 conditioned on 푝푡 ∈ 푃 .
Formally,
휋̂푃 (푦) =
1
푛푃
∑
푡∈푃
1(푦푡 = 푦)
where 푡 ∈ 푃 indicates 푝푡 ∈ 푃 and 푛푃 is the number of periods 푡 ∈ 푃 . The policy context 푃
is coarser than information 퐼 , by definition of the latter. So, the principal behaves as if the agent
shares his prior 휋̂푃 , while the agent behaves as if she receives 퐼 as a private signal.
This is where non-negative ER comes in. The agent’s information 퐼 is useless to her. If there
is a unique best-in-hindsight response within policy context 푃 , then the agent will choose roughly
the same response 푟푡 = 푟푃 in every period 푡 ∈ 푃 . In other words, the policy context 푃 coincides
with the agent’s information 퐼 , and the principal is correct in assuming that the agent (roughly)
optimizes against the empirical distribution 휋̂푃 . Our previous argument goes through.
Again, we just assumed that there is a unique best-in-hindsight response within policy context
푃 . What if this is not the case, i.e. the best-in-hindsight response is not unique? In general, the
argument breaks down. The agent can condition her action on her private information 퐼 , which no
longer necessarily coincides with 푃 . To be clear, this private signal 퐼 remains useless to the agent.
Moreover, the 휖̄-robust policy is by definition robust to multiplicity of best responses. However, if
the agent’s best response is correlated with the state, this can undermine the principal’s utility even
if it does not affect the agent’s.16
The following assumption restricts attention to stage games where this issue does not arise.
Informally, it asserts that if a private signal is useless to the agent, then it has limited relevance to
the principal, assuming that the principal is following (nearly) optimal policies. Formally, the value
of information structure 훾 to the agent in the stage game with common prior 휋 and policy 푝 is
휙푝(휋, 훾) = max
푟,푟퐼∈
E푦∼휋
[
E퐼∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]
− 푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)
]
16For example, consider a stage game with a binary response 푟 ∈ {0, 1}, a binary state 푦 ∈ {0, 1}, and a binary
policy 푝 ∈ {Risky, Safe}. The agent’s utility is always zero. The principal’s utility under the risky policy is 1 if 푟 = 푦
and−1 otherwise. It is slightly negative under the safe policy. If 푦 is drawn from the uniform distribution, and the agent
optimizes without a signal, then the principal prefers the risky policy. If the agent receives a signal that is perfectly
correlated with the state, and sets 푟 = 1 − 푦, then the principal prefers the safe policy.
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This is the expected utility of the agent that optimizes given information structure 훾 minus the
expected utility of the agent if she does not receive a private signal.
Assumption 7. Let 휋 be a distribution, 휖 > 0 be a constant, and 훾 be an information structure
(intuitively, one that is not useful to the agent).
1. If the principal uses 휖-robust policy 푝∗(휋, 휖), his maxmin payoff without 훾 , i.e. 훼푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 휖),
is not much larger than his maxmin payoff with 훾 , i.e. 훼푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 훾, 휖). That is,
훼푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 휖) − 훼푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 훾, 휖) = 푂
(
휙푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 훾)
)
+ 푂(휖)
2. The principal’s maxmax payoff with 훾 under any policy 푝 ∈  , i.e. 훽푝(휋, 훾, 휖), is not much
larger than his maxmax payoff without 훾 under the best-case policy, i.e. max푝̃∈ 훽푝̃(휋, 휖).
That is,
훽푝(휋, 훾, 휖) − max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃(휋, 휖) = 푂
(
휙푝(휋, 훾)
)
+ 푂(휖)
Both parts of assumption 7 would be immediate if the information structure 훾 were uninforma-
tive, because the left-hand sides would be non-positive. Basically, we require useless (to the agent)
private signals to be similar to uninformative private signals in these two respects.
Finally, we are ready to bound the principal’s regret under mechanism 2.
Theorem 2. Assume regularity (assumption 1), restrictions on the stage game (assumptions 2, 4, 7),
휖-boundedCIR (assumption 3), and 휖̃-lower-boundedER (assumption 6). Let 휎∗ be the uninformed-
agent mechanism 2. For any constant 휖̄ > 0, the principal’s expected regret E휎∗
[
PR(퐿, 푦1∶푇 )
]
is at
most
푂(휖̄)
⏟ ⏟
cost of 휖̄-robustness
+ 푂(휖̃)
⏟ ⏟
agent’s information
+
1
휖̄
⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
푂(휖)
⏟ ⏟
agent’s regret
+ 푂̃
(
푇 −1∕4
√|||Δ()|)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
forecast miscalibration
+푂
(
훿
1∕2
Δ()
)
+ 푂(훿) +푂(훿 )
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
discretization error
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Remark 3. If we define the partition Δ to be the smallest possible, then theorem 2 implies that the
principal’s regret vanishes if 푇 → ∞ and 휖, 휖̄, 휖̃, 훿Δ(), 훿 , 훿 → 0 at the appropriate rates. It also
follows from the proof that the principal’s payoffs converge to a natural benchmark: what he would
have obtained in a stationary equilibrium of the repeated game where it is common knowledge that
푦푡 is drawn independently from the empirical distribution 휋̂푃푡 . Formally,
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푉 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡) −
1
푇
∑
푃∈
푛푃 max
푝∈
훽푝(휋̂푃 , 0)→ 0
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8 Mechanism for an Informed Agent
In section 4, we assumed that the principal knows the agent’s learner 퐿. The implication of this
assumption is that the principal is as informed as the agent. In section 5, we assumed that the agent
is as uninformed as the principal. In this section, we allow the agent to be more informed than
the principal. This generality comes at a cost: we no longer ensure vanishing principal’s regret.
Instead, we show that, in the limit, the following mechanism guarantees regret that is no greater
than the cost of informational robustness.
Mechanism 3. Let the distribution 휋푡 be a forecast of the state 푦푡.
• Our forecasting algorithm applies a generic no-internal-regret algorithm due to Blum and
Mansour (2007) in an auxilliary learning problem where the action space consists of the
discretized forecasts 휋 ∈ Δ() and the loss function is the negated quadratic scoring rule.
Fix a parameter 휖̄ > 0. In period 푡, the informed-agent mechanism 휎∗ chooses the discretization of
the 휖̄-informationally-robust policy 푝†(휋푡, 휖̄) that treats the forecast 휋푡 as a common prior.
Theorem 3 builds on the same reasoning as theorems 1 and 2. First, we need to adapt assumption
4 to the case with private signals.
Assumption 8. Let 휖 > 0. Let 휋 and 휋̃ be distributions in the stage game. If the 휖-informationally-
robust policies under 휋 and under 휋̃ are close to one another, then they are also close to the 휖-
informationally-robust policy under any convex combination of these distributions. Formally, for
any 휆 ∈ [0, 1],
푑
(
푝†(휋, 휖), 푝† (휆휋 + (1 − 휆)휋̃, 휖)
)
= 푂
(
푑
(
푝†(휋, 휖), 푝†(휋̃, 휖)
))
Next, recall how, in the previous section, we were concerned that the principal’s policy 푝푡 in
period 푡 was calibrated to the empirical distribution 휋̂푃 given policy context 푃 ∈  (where 푡 ∈
푃 ) rather than the empirical distribution 휋̂퐼 given information 퐼 = 퐼푡. There, we resolved that
problem by assuming the agent was uninformed (non-negative ER). Here, our solution is even
simpler: choose a policy 푝푡 that is robust to the agent’s private information 퐼 , whatever that may
be.
To be more precise, recall that the policy context 푃 is coarser than information 퐼 . We can
interpret periods 푡 ∈ 퐼 as those periods in which the agent received a private signal 퐼 . By looking
at the frequency of information 퐼 within policy context 푃 , we can define an empirical information
structure 훾̂푃 using Bayes’ rule, i.e.
훾̂푃 (퐼, 푦) =
푛퐼 휋̂퐼 (푦)
푛푃 휋̂푃 (푦)
⋅ 1(퐼 ⊆ 푃 )
where 퐼 ⊆ 푃 is shorthand for 푡 ∈ 퐼 ⟹ 푡 ∈ 푃 . Before, we could roughly approximate principal’s
and agent’s utility as their expected utility in the stage game where the state 푦 was drawn from the
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empirical distribution 휋̂퐼 . Now, the approximation is the expected utility in the stage game where
푦 ∼ 휋̂푃 and the agent receives private signal 퐼 from the empirical information structure 훾̂푃 . Of
course, the principal’s policy 푝푡 is robust to all information structures 훾 , including 훾̂푃 .
Next, we formalize this discussion and bound the principal’s regret under mechanism 3.
Theorem 3. Assume regularity (assumption 1), restrictions on the stage game (assumptions 5, 8),
and 휖-bounded CIR (assumption 3). Let 휎∗ be the informed-agent mechanism 3. For any constant
휖̄ > 0, the principal’s expected regret E휎∗
[
PR(퐿, 푦1∶푇 )
]
is at most
1
푇
∑
푃∈
푛푃∇(휋̂푃 ) +푂(휖̄)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
cost of 휖̄-informational-robustness
+
1
휖̄
⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
푂(휖)
⏟ ⏟
agent’s regret
+ 푂̃
(
푇 −1∕4
√|||Δ()|)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
forecast miscalibration
+푂
(
훿
1∕2
Δ()
)
+푂(훿) + 푂(훿)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
discretization error
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Remark 4. In contrast to our previous results, this regret bound does not vanish. However, if we
define the partition Δ to be the smallest possible, the bound does converge to
1
푇
∑
푃∈
푛푃∇(휋̂푃 )
as 푇 → ∞ and 휖, 휖̄, 훿Δ(), 훿 , 훿 → 0 at the appropriate rates. This is the best possible guaran-
tee in a stationary equilibrium of the repeated game where (a) it is common knowledge that 푦푡 is
drawn independently from the empirical distribution 휋̂푃푡 and (b) the agent has access to an unknown
information structure 훾 .
9 Conclusion
We studied single-agent mechanism design where the common prior assumption is replaced with
repeated interaction and frequent feedback about the world. Our primary motivation was to remove
a barrier (the common prior) that makes it difficult to implement mechanisms in practice. However,
we also want to emphasize that this work can be viewed as a learning foundation for (robust) mech-
anism design. Indeed, our results show that policies similar to those predicted by a common prior
can perform well even without making any assumptions about the data-generating process. This
lends credibility to researchers who invoke the common prior for tractability, but do not expect it
to be taken literally. However, there are two caveats.
1. Our policies are robust to agents that behave suboptimally by up to some 휖 > 0. In contrast,
most papers on local robustness involve an optimizing agent with misspecified beliefs (e.g.
Artemov et al. 2013; Meyer-ter-Vehn and Morris 2011; Oury and Tercieux 2012). These
notions coincide sometimes but not always. In addition, our policies sometimes require in-
formational robustness (Bergemann and Morris 2013).
24
2. The number of interactions 푇 required for our mechanisms to approximate the static common
prior game may be large. In particular, our bounds depend on features of the stage game, like
the size of the policy and response spaces, and the number of states. These features may also
affect the agent’s learning rate, which in turn affects our bounds. In that sense, the common
prior assumption may be less appealing in more games that are more complex.
Further Work. There are several directions in which to generalize and improve this work. To
begin, it is not clear whether our finite sample bounds have a tight dependence on the number of
periods 푇 and various other parameters. For example, is it possible to remove the exponential
dependence in theorem 1 on the size of the policy space?17 In addition, there may be opportunities
for tightening our results in less abstract settings where the stage game has more structure.
Our analysis was restricted to single-agent problems. Suppose there are multiple agents. From
the perspective of any one agent, her opponents correspond to adaptive adversaries (c.f. Arora,
Dinitz, et al. 2018) whose future behavior is influenced by the agent’s present response. However, if
the number of participants is large and the mechanism’s outcome preserves the differential privacy
of each agent’s response history (c.f. McSherry and Talwar 2007), the behavioral assumptions
developed here may also be suitable for the multi-agent setting.
We assumed that the principal and agent observe the state after every interaction, but this may
be unrealistic in many applications. For instance, in contract theory the state is a function from
the agent’s actions to outcomes. Let us briefly refer to the principal-agent problem in appendix
A.2. There, if the agent chooses to work, we do observe whether the project succeeds or not.
However, we may not learn whether the project would have succeeded had the agent shirked. To
mitigate this issue, we could consider the case with bandit feedback, where participants observe
their own payoffs but not the state. The challenge with bandit feeback is that it requires responsive
mechanisms, as the mechanism must depend on the principal’s payoffs, which in turn depend on
the agent’s response.18
In section 8, where the agent may be more informed than the principal, the principal’s regret
did not vanish but rather converged to the cost of informational robustness under a common prior.
There is reason to believe that this result is not tight. Although the principal will never have access
to the private signal 퐼 of the agent, he may attempt to learn (via the agent’s past behavior) about
the information structure 훾 that generates it. In turn, the agent may anticipate this and attempt to
manipulate the principal’s policy by feigning (partial) ignorance of her private signal. This suggests
a less conservative definition of informational robustness, where the principal learns the quality of
any information that the agent decides to exploit. However, in the repeated game, this approach
would require responsive mechanisms.
17One approach the principalmight take is to attempt to discern the agent’s beliefs from the description of her learner
퐿, and substitute those beliefs for his own forecast. If successful, this would tie the principal’s forecast miscalibration
to the agent’s counterfactual internal regret.
18Relatedly, Balcan, Blum, Haghtalab, et al. (2015) consider a repeated Stackelberg game where the state is the
agent’s private type. The principal receives bandit feedback: he never observes the type directly but can infer it from
the agent’s behavior. The issues associated with responsiveness do not arise in this model as the agent is myopic (or
more precisely, there is a sequence of short-lived agents).
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As the last two paragraphs illustrate, we need a theory of behavior for responsive mechanisms.
The no-regret conditions used here and elsewhere are not as well-motivated when the mechanism
(or adversary) is responsive, insofar as they do not generalize traditional rationality assumptions.
Extending the logic of no-regret conditions to a larger set of mechanisms – but not necessarily all
mechanisms – is a clear priority for further work.
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A Special Cases
A.1 Bayesian Persuasion
There is an informed sender (i.e. principal) and an uninformed receiver (i.e. agent). The principal
designs the process by which information is revealed to the agent. Let be a finite set of messages
that he can send. Knowing that the agent will react to an informativemessage, the principal attempts
to persuade the agent towards actions that he prefers. Let be a finite set of actions that the agent
can take. The agent chooses a response 푟 ∶ →  that maps messages to actions.
A policy is an information structure 푝 ∶  → Δ(). That is, an information structure 푝푡(푦푡)
describes the probability of a message 푚푡 being sent, conditional on the state being 푦푡. The agent
receives the message 푚푡 and takes action 푎푡 = 푟푡(푚푡). While the agent may not know the process
that generated the state 푦푡, she understands the process 푝푡 that generates the message푚푡 conditional
on the state. Armed with this understanding, she can infer something about the state 푦푡 based on
the message 푚푡.
All that remains is to specify payoffs. Let 푢 ∶ × → ℝ be the agent’s utility function from a
given action in a given state. Similarly, let 푣 ∶ × → ℝ be the principal’s utility. In the previous
subsection, the utility functions 푈, 푉 depended on the triple (푟, 푝, 푦) rather than the pair (푎, 푦). To
reconcile the two models, we let participants evaluate (푟, 푝, 푦) by their expected utility conditional
on the state. Formally,
푈 (푟, 푝, 푦) =
∑
푚∈
푝(푚, 푦) ⋅ 푢(푟(푚), 푦) and 푉 (푟, 푝, 푦) =
∑
푚∈
푝(푚, 푦) ⋅ 푣(푟(푚), 푦)
When the state is fixed, the residual variation in utility is due to the fact that messages are drawn
randomly from the distribution 푝(푦). These distributions are common knowledge because the agent
observes the principal’s policy 푝 before taking an action. Indeed, the fact that the principal commits
to an information structure is the defining feature of Bayesian persuasion.
Example 1 (Judge-Prosecutor Game). The state space is  = {Innocent,Guilty} and the action
space is = {Convict,Acquit}. The judge has 0-1 utility 푢 and prefers to convict if the defendant
is guilty and acquit if the defendant is innocent. Regardless of the state, the prosecutor’s utility 푣
is 1 following a conviction and 0 following an acquittal.
This example satisfies regularity (1) with the discrete metric on , the 푙1-metric on  , and
퐾푈

= 퐾푉

= 퐾푈

= 퐾푉

= 1.
The worst-case policy 푝∗(휋, 휖) sends the message “convict” whenever the defendant is guilty.
If the defendant is innocent, it sends the message “convict” with probability
푞 = max
{
1,min
{
0,
푝 − 휖
1 − 푝
}}
The cost of 휖-robustness Δ(휋, 휖) = 푂(휖) decreases smoothly with 휖. This game satisfies assump-
tion ?? since 푞 is increasing in 푝 (and hence convex combinations of distributions 푝 will yield 푞
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that is bounded between the 휖-robust policies for the extremal distributions, which are close by
assumption).
The worst-case policy 푝†(휋, 휖) for an unknown private signal is full transparency. The cost of
informational robustness, i.e. ∇(휋, 0), is the difference between the principal’s value under the
common prior 휋 and his payoff under full transparency. This game satisfies assumption ?? with
푀1 = 1 and푀2 = 푂(휖). It trivially satisfies assumptions ?? and ?? since 푝
† is constant.
A.2 Contract Design
In classic models of moral hazard, the principal incentivizes an agent to put effort into a task the
principal cares about. The timing of the game is as follows: (1) the principal commits to a contract,
(2) the agent takes a hidden action, (3) nature randomly chooses an outcome, (4) the agent is paid
based on the outcome, (5) the game concludes. For concreteness, we consider the limited liability
model due to Sappington (1983) where both participants are risk-neutral but the principal is not
allowed to charge the agent. This model has been popularized by recent work in robust contract
design (see e.g. Carroll 2015, Dütting et al. 2019).
Formally, let be a finite set of actions that the agent can take. Let be a finite set of outcomes
표. The principal observes the outcome but not the action. The state 푦 ∶  →  describes how
actions map to outcomes. The employer commits to a contract 푝 ∶  → [0, 푝̄] that specifies a
non-negative payment for each outcome. The cost function 푐 ∶  → ℝ describes how costly it is
for the agent to take a particular action. The agent’s utility function is
푈 (푟, 푝, 푦) = 푝(푦(푟)) − 푐(푟)
The benefit function 푏 ∶ → ℝ describes how beneficial a given outcome is to the principal. The
principal’s utility function is
푉 (푟, 푝, 푦) = 푏(푦(푟)) − 푝(푦(푟))
Through the contract 푝, the principal can incentivize the agent to take actions that, depending on
the state, will lead to a more beneficial outcome.
Example 2. The agent is given a task of unknown difficulty. There are two actions = {work, shirk},
two outcomes  = {success, failure}, and three states  = {trivial,moderate, impossible}. In the
trivial state, both actions lead to success. In the impossible state, both actions lead to failure. In
the moderate state, work leads to success and shirk leads to failure.
The principal’s benefits are 푏(success) = 2 and 푏(failure) = 0. The agent’s costs are 푐(work) =
1 and 푐(shirk) = 0. In the impossible and trivial states, the optimal contract pays nothing after both
outcpmes and the agent will shirk. In the moderate state, the optimal contract pays 푝(success) = 5
to cover the agent’s costs if she works, otherwise 푝(failure) = 0. Generally, if the principal pays
the agent after success, the agent will have to take into account the risk that the task turns out to be
impossible (where work induces costs without any payment) or trivial (where work is not required
for payment). To incentivize work, the contract must compensate the agent accordingly.
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This example satisfies regularity (1) with 푈, 푉 normalized, the discrete metric on , the sup-
norm-metric on  , and 퐾푈

= 퐾푉

= 퐾푈

= 퐾푉

= 1.
The worst-case policy 푝∗(휋, 휖) sets 푝(failure) = 0 and
푝(success) =
푐(work) − 푐(shirk) + 휖
휋(moderate)
so long as 푝(success) ≤ 푝̄ and the principal’s 휋-expected payoff is greater than zero when the
agent works. Otherwise, the worst-case policy sets all transfers to zero. The cost of 휖-robustness
Δ(휋, 휖) = 푂(휖) decreases smoothly with 휖.
This game satisfies assumption ??. To see this, note that as long as working is strictly more
costly than shirking, the optimal policies that induce effort are bounded away from the optimal
policies that do not. Among the policies that do not induce effort, convex combinations of the
distribution will not make inducing effort desirable. Among policies that do induce effort, the fact
that the payments following success are decreasing in 휋(moderate) means (as in the last section)
that convex combinations of distributions lead to optimal policies that are between the extremal
policies.
The worst-case policy 푝†(휋, 휖) for an unknown private signal is the same as the optimal policy
under a common prior without a private signal. The cost of informational robustness, i.e. ∇(휋, 0),
is the difference between the principal’s value when the agent only works in the “moderate” state
and the principal pays her cost of effort conditional on success (assuming the principal prefers this
to shirking with zero transfers) and his value in the common prior game without a private signal.
This game satisfies assumption ?? with푀1 = 푂(휖) and푀2 = 0.
B Agent’s Learning Problem
Upper bounds on external regret are often viewed as compelling assumptions (e.g. Nekipelov et
al. 2015, Braverman et al. 2018) because there exist relatively simple algorithms that guarantee
vanishing ER as 푇 → ∞. For example, the exponential weights algorithm (a.k.a. hedge algorithm,
exponentiated gradient algorithm) satisfies no-ER. In contrast, our behavioral assumptions – e.g.
no-FCIR – may appear daunting, insofar as the agent must solve a learning problem with a context
space that is exponential in the number of alternative mechanisms, |Σ0|. When both the sequence
of states 푦1∶푇 and the learner 퐿 are particularly pathological, no-FCIR may indeed be too strong
an assumption. When the the learner satisfies additional properties, or sequence of states has some
stochastic structure (e.g. is i.i.d. or Markov), no-FCIR may be more reasonable.
In this section, we make one simple observation. There exists a learner that guarantees no-
FCIR (and hence no-CIR) for the agent under our mechanism from theorem 2, with the best rate of
convergence we can hope for.
Definition 15 (CFL). Suppose the principal publicizes the forecast 휋푡 in every period 푡.
19 The
19In our view, part of the principal’s objective is to make the agent’s problem as simple as possible. From a worst-
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common forecast learner (CFL) sets
푟푡 ∈ argmax
푟∈
E푦∼휋푡
[
푈 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡)
]
Proposition 3 verifies that the CFL satisfies the behavioral assumptions of theorem 2.
Proposition 3. Let 휎∗ be the mechanism from theorem 2. Then the CFL satisfies 휖-bounded FCIR
(4) in expectation, i.e.
E퐿,휎∗[FCIR] ≤ 휖 = 푂̃
(
1
푇 1∕4
√||| |) +푂 (√||훿)
and 휖̃-lower-bounded FER (5), where 휖̃ = 0. Moreover, if the agent uses CFL, the principal’s regret
bound in theorem 2 applies regardless of whether alignment (9) holds.
Note that these rates preserve the 푇 1∕4 convergence rate (up to 훿 error) that is present in all of
our mechanisms and reflects miscalibration of the principal. In that sense, the fact that the agent is
also learning does not deteriorate the principal’s performance at all. Although this has not been our
emphasis so far, it would be interesting to see whether (or identify conditions under which) other
simple learning algorithms satisfy our behavioral assumptions with decent rates of convergence.
C Calibrated Forecasting
In this appendix, we describe our forecasting algorithm and bound its miscalibration.
A linearly homogeneous, differentiable function퐻 is strongly convex with parameter 휉 if
퐻(휋) ≥ 퐻(휋̃) + ∇퐻(휋̃) ⋅ (휋 − 휋̃) +
휉
2
‖휋 − 휋̃‖2
2
The gradient of 퐻 describes a proper scoring rule 푆(휋) = ∇퐻(휋) where 퐻(휋) = 휋 ⋅ 푆(휋) (Mc-
Carthy 1956). A scoring rule 푆 ∶ Δ() → ℝ is proper if the report 휋̃ that maximizes the
휋-expected score is the distribution 휋. Strong convexity of퐻 can be thought of as sharpening the
incentives for truth-telling (Boutilier 2012).
Specifically, consider the quadratic scoring rule (see e.g. Jose et al. 2008)
푆푦(휋) = 2휋(푦) −
∑
푦̃∈
휋(푦̃)2
where퐻(휋) = ‖휋‖2
2
is strongly convex with 휉 = 2.
Recall that the mechanism 휎∗ is supposed to be nonresponsive. As a consequence, we cannot
determine the principal’s beliefs 휋푡 in a given period based on his historical payoffs. To ensure that
case perspective, there is no benefit to hiding this information. With that said, we see no reason why this result should
not apply under the weaker assumption that the principal’s forecasting algorithm is public knowledge.
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the beliefs 휋푡 are well-calibrated, we consider an auxilliary online learning problem based on a scor-
ing rule 푆. In period 푡, the principal makes a prediction 휋푡 with loss function 푆푦푡(휋푡). Specifically,
the predictions come from the discretized set of priors 1, formed by choosing a representative
element 휋 from each set in the partition  . In terms of the score, this approximation has limited
cost. Let 휋 =
[
휋̂퐹
]
1
be the belief 휋 ∈ 1 that is closest to the empirical distribution 휋̂퐹 . Then
푆푦(휋̂퐹 ) − 푆푦(휋) ≤ 푆푦(휋̂퐹 ) − 푆푦(휋̂퐹 − 훿 )
= 2휋̂퐹 (푦) −
∑
푦̃∈
휋̂퐹 (푦̃)
2 − 2(휋̂퐹 (푦) − 훿 ) +
∑
푦̃∈
(휋̂퐹 (푦̃) − 훿 )
2
= 2훿 −
∑
푦̃∈
휋̂퐹 (푦̃)
2 +
∑
푦̃∈
(휋̂퐹 (푦̃) − 훿 )
2
≤ 2훿 (6)
where 휋̂퐹 − 훿 is shorthand notation for the vector
(
휋̂퐹 (푦) − 훿
)
푦∈
.
In this auxilliary problem, the exponential weights algorithm (see e.g. Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
2006) obtains expected external regret at most√
2푇 log |푆 |
relative to the best-in-hindsight 휋∗
퐹
∈ 1. A reduction due to Blum and Mansour (2007) (theorem
5) translates this into a bound on expected internal regret of
|푆 |√2푇 log |푆 |
relative to the best-in-hindsight 휋∗
퐹
∈ 1. Combine this with the maximum approximation error (6)
to bound the expected internal regret relative to the best-in-hindsight contextual belief 휋 ∈ Δ(),
which must be the empirical distribution 휋̂퐹 since 푆 is proper. Specifically,
|푆 |√2푇 log |푆 | + 2푇 훿 ≥ E[∑
휋∈1
푛퐹 휋̂퐹 ⋅
(
푆(휋̂퐹 ) − 푆(휋)
)]
(7)
where 푛퐹 is the number of periods 푡 where
[
휋푡
]
1
= 퐹푡. This is a statement about the expected
scoring loss, where the expectation reflects randomization in the algorithm. Our next result, lemma
3, translates this into a statement about the 푙1 distance between the principal’s belief 휋 and the
empirical distribution 휋̂퐹 .
Lemma 3. Let푆 be a proper scoring rule where the optimal expected score퐻 is 휉-strongly convex.
Then √
2||휅
휉
≥
1
푇
∑
휋∈1
푛퐹푑1(휋, 휋̂퐹 )
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where
휅 =
1
푇
∑
휋∈1
푛퐹 휋̂퐹 ⋅
(
푆(휋̂퐹 ) − 푆(휋)
)
Proof. Consider the principal’s 휋-expected regret from predicting 휋̃:
휋 ⋅ (푆(휋) − 푆(휋̃)) = 퐻(휋) − 휋 ⋅ ∇퐻(휋̃)
≥ 퐻(휋̃) − ∇퐻(휋̃) ⋅ 휋̃ +
휉
2
‖휋 − 휋̃‖2
2
=
휉
2
‖휋 − 휋̃‖2
2
≥
휉
2
(
1√||‖휋 − 휋̃‖1
)2
=
휉
2||‖휋 − 휋̃‖21
where the second-to-last line follows from ‖ ⋅ ‖1 ≤ ||1∕2‖ ⋅ ‖2. It follows that his regret in the
auxilliary problem satisfies
휅 ≥
1
푇
∑
휋∈1
푛퐹
휉
2||푑1 (휋, 휋̂퐹)2
where, implicitly, 퐹 is the forecast context such that 휋 ∈ 퐹 . Take the square root of both sides of
this inequality:
√
휅 ≥
√
1
푇
∑
휋∈1
푛퐹
휉
2||푑1 (휋, 휋̂퐹)2
≥
1√
푇
⋅
1√
푇
∑
휋∈1
푛퐹
√
휉
2||푑1 (휋, 휋̂퐹)
≥
√
휉
2|| ⋅ 1푇 ∑
휋∈1
푛퐹푑1
(
휋, 휋̂퐹
)
where the first line is the 푙2 norm of a vector with 푇 entries, the second line is the 푙1 norm of that
same vector, and the inequality follows from ‖ ⋅ ‖1 ≤ 푇 1∕2‖ ⋅ ‖2. Collapse these inequalities and
rearrange terms to obtain the desired result.
If we use the quadratic scoring rule, this lemma implies
E
[
1
푇
∑
휋∈1
푛퐹푑1(휋, 휋̂퐹 )
]
≤
√
|||푆 |√2 log |푆 |푇 + 2||훿 (8)
To optimize this bound, up to log factors, set 훿 =
(
1
푇
) 1
2||+2
, assuming |푆 | = (( 1훿 )||
)
.
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D Generalized Results
Upper bounds on CIR constitute our rationality assumptions for the agent. However, our results also
rely on informational assumptions. Sections 4, 5, and 6 consider environments that differ primarily
by how “informed” the agent appears, relative to the principal. In all three cases, however, we
require the agent to be at least as informed as the principal. What is the principal’s information?
Recall that our mechanisms 휎∗ will be forecast mechanisms (??). A calibrated learning algorithm
– which we specify later on – will produce a sequence of forecasts 휋1,… , 휋푇 . It is possible that
these forecasts will become correlated with the state, e.g. if there is a trend in the data. We do not
rule this out; however, if our forecasts inadvertently pick up useful information, this information
should be available to the agent as well (either implicitly or because we publish 휋푡 along with 푝푡).
The notion of forecastwise regret (and forecastwise CIR) formalizes what we mean by the prin-
cipal’s “information” being available to the agent. The agent’s benchmark includes the principal’s
forecast as additional context. Formally, define the forecast space  = Δ(). Fix a small constant
훿 > 0 and consider a finite partition 푆 of  where 휋, 휋̃ ∈ 퐹 ∈ 푆 implies 푑∞ (휋, 휋̃) ≤ 훿 . Let
1 ⊆  contain a single distribution 휋 ∈ 퐹 for every 퐹 ∈ 푆 .
Definition 16. Let the information partition combine the forecast and CIR context, i.e.
 = 푆 ×
(
푆
)Σ
and let the information 퐼푡 ∈  in period 푡 be the unique set that satisfies(
휋푡, 푟
∗
푡
, (푟
푝
푡 )푝∈0
)
∈ 퐼푡
Definition 17 (FCIR). The agent’s forecastwise CIR relative to a modification rule ℎ ∶  →  is
FCIR(ℎ) =
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
(
푈 (ℎ(퐼푡), 푝푡, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡)
)
The FCIR relative to the best-in-hindsight modification rule is FCIR = maxℎ∶→ FCIR(ℎ).
To state our assumption, we need to define a forecastwise version of ER, just as we defined a
forecastwise version of CIR at the end of section 3. Let the forecast context 퐹푡 ∈ 푆 in period 푡 be
the unique set that satisfies 휋푡 ∈ 퐹푡.
Definition 18 (FER). The agent’s forecastwise external regret relative to a strategy ℎ ∶ 푆 → 
is
FER(ℎ) =
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
(
푈 (ℎ(퐹푡), 푝푡, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡)
)
The FER relative to the best-in-hindsight strategy is FER = maxℎ∶→ FER(ℎ).
Theorem 4. Assume regularity (1) and 휖-bounded FCIR (4). There exists a nonresponsive mech-
anism 휎∗ parameterized by the agent’s learner 퐿 and a constant 휖̄ > 0 such that
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1. The principal’s regret is bounded, i.e.
E휎∗[PR] ≤
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼Δ(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
1
휖̄
(
푂(휖) + 푂̃
(
푇 −1∕4
√|||푆 ||푅|(|Σ0|+|푆 |)∕2) + 푂 (훿1∕2 ) +푂(훿 ))
Assumption 9 (Alignment). The stage game is (휖,푀1,푀2)-aligned if, for all signals 훾 ,(
휙푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 휖) − 훼푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 훾, 휖)
)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
maximum downside of 훾 for the principal
≤푀1 max
푟,푟퐽∈
E푦∼휋
[
E퐽∼훾̃(⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟퐽 , 푝
∗(휋, 휖), 푦)
]
− 푈 (푟, 푝∗(휋, 휖), 푦)
]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
usefulness of 훾 to the agent
+푀2
and, for all policies 푝 ∈ 0,(
훽푝(휋, 훾, 휖) − 휙푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 휖)
)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
maximum upside of 훾 for the principal
≤푀1 max
푟,푟퐽∈
E푦∼휋
[
E퐽∼훾̃(⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟퐽 , 푝, 푦)
]
− 푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)
]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
usefulness of 훾 to the agent
+푀2
Theorem 5. Assume regularity (1), 휖-boundedFCIR (4), 휖̃-lower-boundedFER (5), and (휖̄,푀1,푀2)-
alignment (9). There exists a nonresponsive mechanism 휎∗ parameterized by 휖̄ such that
1. The principal’s regret is bounded, i.e.
E휎∗[PR] ≤
1
푇
∑
퐹∈푆
푛퐹Δ(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) +
1
휖̄
(
푂(휖) + 푂̃
(
푇 −1∕4
√|||푆 |) +푂 (√훿) +푂(훿 ))
+ 푂(휖̃) +푀1
(
푂(휖̃) + 푂(휖) + 푂̃
(
푇 −1∕4
√|||푆 |) + 푂 (√훿) +푂(훿)) + 푂(푀2)
Theorem 6. Assume regularity (1) and 휖-bounded FCIR (4). There exists a nonresponsive mech-
anism 휎∗ parameterized by a constant 휖̄ > 0 such that
1. The principal’s regret is bounded, i.e.
E휎∗[PR] ≤
1
푇
∑
퐹∈푆
푛퐹Δ(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) +
1
휖̄
(
푂(휖) + 푂̃
(
푇 −1∕4
√|||푆 |) +푂 (훿1∕2 ) + 푂(훿))
E Omitted Proofs
E.1 Proof of Propositions ?? and ??
Recall that a policy 푝푡 in period 푡 can affect the agent’s behavior 휇휏 in period 휏 > 푡. This raises
the prospect that a mistake today can cause irreversible damage to the principal’s average utility.
By definition, the principal will regret that mistake. This would make the principal’s problem
infeasible, in that he cannot guarantee low regret for himself.
Generally-speaking, regret bounds can bypass this problem if they restrict howmuch the agent’s
response 푟푡 depends on the policy history 푝1∶푡−1. This is reasonable a priori, since the policy history
37
푝1∶푡−1 appears irrelevant to the agent’s problem. It neither affects nor predicts the state 푦푡, except
through its dependence on 푦1∶푡−1. It is not needed as a predictor of the policy 푝푡 because the agent
observes 푝푡 before choosing a response.
20 For these reasons, it seems that the agent can only make
herself worse off by allowing irrelevant variables like 푝1∶푡−1 to affect her response 푟푡. This would be
true if our notion of good performance overall had clear implications for behavior in each period, so
that unecessary variation in behavior implies a departure from optimality. Unfortunately, there are
various kinds of behavior that obtain low ER. The agent can easily switch between these behaviors
while still satisfying no-ER. In the process, she can cause substantial benefit or harm to the principal.
To clarify the problem, we present several examples of learners that we regard as pathological.
These are implicit counterexamples to the proposition that no-ER constraints are sufficient for no-
regret mechanism design.
Our counterexamples are closely related to the pathological phenomenon of “superefficiency” in
statistics. Supposewe are trying to estimate themean 휃 of the normal randomvariable푋 ∼ 푁(휃, 1),
given an i.i.d. random sample푋1,… , 푋푛. Our objective is to minimize the mean square error, but
this depends on the parameter 휃. A typical solution is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE),
which in this case outputs the sample mean 푛−1
∑푛
푖=1
푋푖. For reasons that are unimportant to our
discussion, MLE is considered “efficient”. However, it is easy to find an estimator that outperforms
MLE. For example, a wild-ass guess (WAG) ignores the data and outputs 휃∗. If it happens to be the
case that 휃 = 휃∗ then this estimator is optimal.
In the following example, we construct a learner that alternates between a WAG-like predictor
and a MLE-like predictor depending on a seemingly irrelevant choice by the principal.
Example 3 (Selective Superefficiency). Consider a learner 퐿 that is capable – either by ingenuity
or dumb luck – of predicting the state sequence 푦1∶푇 perfectly. However, the learner uses this ability
only selectively, depending on the state 푦1 and policy 푝1 in the first period. Despite this seemingly
irrational behavior, the learner satisfies vanishing external regret.
Let 푃 ⊊  be a nonempty subset of policies. Let 푌 ⊊  be a nonempty subset of states. Let
푟 ∗ be the best-in-hindsight response by time 푇 . That is, consider some 푟∗ ∈  that happens to be
best-in-hindsight given the realized state sequence 푦1∶푇 but will not be best-in-hindsight uniformly
over all state sequences. Given 푦1∶푇 , define the learner 퐿 as follows:
1. If 푦1 ∈ 푌 and 푝1 ∈ 푃 then use response 푟
∗
2. If 푦1 ∈ 푌 and 푝1 ∉ 푃 then use the response that happens to be optimal given 푦푡.
3. If 푦1 ∉ 푌 and 푝1 ∈ 푃 then use the response that happens to be optimal given 푦푡.
4. If 푦1 ∉ 푌 and 푝1 ∉ 푃 then use response 푟
∗
20For example, if the agent were Bayesian then there would be no dependence on 푝1∶푡 at all. If the agent used the
exponential weights algorithm then there would only be an indirect dependence, since that algorithm depends on the
agent’s historical payoffs and these, in turn, depend on the policy history.
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In cases 1 and 4, the learner follows the best-in-hindsight response and therefore achieves zero
regret. In cases 2 and 3, the learner acts optimally ex post and therefore achieves non-positive
regret.
Nonetheless, no mechanism can guarantee no-regret for the principal. Suppose the mechanism
chooses 푝1 ∈ 푃 . If it turns out that 푦1 ∈ 푌 then the agent will follow 휋
∗. Otherwise, the agent will
be superefficient. Were the mechanism to deviate to 푝1 ∉ 푃 , the situation would be reversed. These
constitute permanent changes in the agent’s behavior. Suppose one type of behavior is “better”
for the principal than another. It is always possible in hindsight that the mechanism’s first-period
policy was the one that led to the “worse” type of behavior.
Can further assumptions rule out this kind of behavior? Again, consider the analogy with statis-
tics. TheWAG estimator – always predict 휃∗ – will perform very poorly in the counterfactual world
where 휃∗ ≠ 휃. Formally, this estimator is not “consistent”. Similarly, the learner from example 3
does not guarantee vanishing average external regret under counterfactual state sequences. This
reflects a peculiar unresponsiveness to the data.
Unfortunately, imposing consistency or no-regret on all sequences does not rule out these kinds
of pathologies. Consider Hodge’s (superefficient) estimator, which outputs 휃∗ unless there is suf-
ficient evidence that 휃 ≠ 휃∗. In that case, it outputs the sample mean. If “sufficient evidence” is
defined carefully, this estimator will outperform MLE when 휃 = 휃∗ and will asympotically match
MLE otherwise. We can patch up example 3 in a similar way.
Example 4 (Selective Superefficiency, revised). We want to modify the learner in example 3 to
ensure no-regret on all counterfactual state sequences 푦̃1∶푇 . This is straightforward. In period 푡+1,
if the history 푦̃1∶푡 matches the presumed sequence 푦1∶푡 exactly, then proceed as before. Otherwise,
follow any no-ER algorithm. This guarantees vanishing average regret as long as the regret from
the first period 푡 where 푦̃1∶푡 ≠ 푦1∶푡 is bounded – which it is, since our utility functions are bounded.
Therefore, for any sequence 푦1∶푡 there is a learner that satisfies no-regret on all sequences, but
exhibits the pathological behavior from example 3 on the realized sequence.
Statisticians deal with superefficiency by arguing that it generically fails to occur. That is,
any alternative estimator will weakly underperform MLE on Lebesgue-almost all values 휃. For
example, we can view Hodge’s estimator as asymptotically equivalent to MLE whenever 휃 ≠ 휃∗.
In our setting, attempting this argument would necessitate a definition of genericity for sequences
of states. While we can provide various definitions, none seem especially compelling.21
Another natural restriction to impose is that the learner should not outperform the experts. That
is, given the sequence 푦1∶푇 , we only consider learners whose regret at period 푇 is non-negative.
Clearly, this rules out the learners in examples 3 and 4, which may obtain negative regret in the
sequences where it predicts the state perfectly and acts on that information. Unfortunately, this
does not rule out the broader phenomenon, as the following example illustrates.
21For example, one could assign equal measure to each sequence 푦1∶푇 in the set 
푇 of all possible sequences. By
this measure, the measure of any constant sequence (푦,… , 푦) would converge to zero as 푇 → ∞. Yet it does not seem
unreasonable a priori that the world should persist in a fixed state. Alternatively, one could assign equal measure to all
permutations of a given sequence 푦1∶푇 . This would effectively return us to an i.i.d. setting.
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Example 5 (Selective Superinefficiency). As in example 3, define a learner퐿 that appears capable
of predicting the state sequence 푦1∶푇 perfectly. This learner will continue to use this ability selec-
tively. Moreover, when the learner uses this ability, she does not always use it to her advantage.
Instead, with probability 1− 푞 she uses it to her own disadvantage. When 푞 is chosen correctly, the
learner satisfies zero regret for all mechanisms.
Let 푃 ⊊  be a nonempty subset of policies. Let 푌 ⊊  be a nonempty subset of states. Let 푟∗
be the best-in-hindsight response by time 푇 . Let 푟†푡 be the response that happens to be optimal for
푦푡. Let 푟̃푡 be the response that minimizes the agent’s utility when the state is 푦푡. Given 푦1∶푇 , define
the learner 퐿 as follows:
1. If 푦1 ∈ 푌 and 푝1 ∈ 푃 then use response 푟
∗
2. If 푦1 ∈ 푌 and 푝1 ∉ 푃 then use 푟
†
푡 with probability 푞 and 푟̃푡 with probability 1 − 푞
3. If 푦1 ∉ 푌 and 푝1 ∈ 푃 then use 푟
†
푡 with probability 푞 and 푟̃푡 with probability 1 − 푞
4. If 푦1 ∉ 푌 and 푝1 ∉ 푃 then use prior 휋
∗
In cases 1 and 4, the learner follows the best-in-hindsight prior and therefore achieves zero regret.
In cases 2 and 3, as long as 푟̃푡 underperforms 푟
∗ in every period 푡, by continuity there exists a
probability 푞 such that the agent achieves zero regret.
This learner now satisfies both an upper bound and a lower bound on regret. Nonetheless, our
difficulties remain. Just as in example 3, the first-period policy can cause permanent changes in
the agent’s behavior. It is always possible in hindsight that the mechanism’s first-period policy was
the one that led to the “worse” type of behavior.
We can use this example to prove proposition ?? (proposition ?? is a corollary). In the Bayesian
persuasion example, let 푦2∶푇 be drawn i.i.d. where the defendant is guilty with probability 푞 =
0.5 − 휖 for a very small 휖 > 0. If the principal chooses 푝1 correctly, he can persuade the agent to
convict with probability near one. Otherwise, the agent convicts with probability near 0.5.
In the contract theory example, let 푦2∶푇 be be drawn i.i.d. from some distribution where the
principal would find it optimal to pay the agent in the stage game, but both states occur with pos-
itive probability. If the principal chooses 푝1 correctly, he can pay the agent her cost of effort and
achieve the first-best outcome (agent works iff working is effective). Otherwise, the principal has
to compensate the agent for her cost of effort in states where working is ineffective.
The fundamental problemwith the learners in examples 3, 4, 5 is not that they arewell-informed.
After all, in some settings we might reasonably expect the agent to be better informed than the ana-
lyst. The problem is that they fail to consistently and fully exploit the private information that they
clearly possess. Bounds on counterfactual internal regret capture this failure to exploit information
and rule out these kinds of pathological behaviors.
Example 6. Returning to example 3, consider two constant mechanisms 휎푝 and 휎푝̃ where 푝 ∈ 푃
and 푝̃ ∉ 푃 . Regardless of the state sequence 푦1∶푇 , exactly one of these mechanisms (say 휎
푝) will
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cause the agent to predict the state perfectly while the other will cause the agent to follow the best-
in-hindsight prior. The agent’s behavior 푟푝 following 휎푝 will differ across periods 푦푡, 푦휏 if and only
if 푦푡 ≠ 푦휏 , while the behavior 푟
푝̃ following 휎푝̃ remains constant throughout. The vector (푟푝, 푟푝̃) will
therefore differ across periods 푦푡, 푦휏 if and only if 푦푡 ≠ 푦휏 .
If we require the agent to have no-contextual regret where the context is (푟푝, 푟푝̃), it is equivalent
to requiring her to predict the state perfectly even if the principal uses 휎푝̃. This is essentially the
context used to define CIR. The learner guarantees no-CIR under mechanism 휎푝, because it predicts
the state perfectly. However, it does not predict the state perfectly under mechanism 휎푝̃, so in this
case the agent accumulates CIR.
E.2 Proof of Lemmas ?? and ?? and Additional Results
The lemmas in this section will be used repeatedly in the proofs of theorems 1, 2, and 3.
E.2.1 Proof of Lemmas ?? and ??
Lemma ?? states that for any policy 푝, information structure 훾 , constants 휖, 휖̃ > 0, and distribution
휋, we have
훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖 + 휖̃) ≥ 훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖) −
휖̃
휖
and 훽푝(휋, 훾, 휖 + 휖̃) ≤ 훽푝(휋, 훾, 휖) +
휖̃
휖
Note that lemma ?? is just a special case where the information structure 훾 is uninformative. To
prove this, define
퐵(휋, 훾, 휖) =
{
휇퐽 ∈ Δ() ∣ 휖 ≥ max
푟̃퐽∈
E푦∼휋
[
E퐽∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟̃퐽 , 푝, 푦) − E푟∼휇퐽 [푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]}
and recall that
훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖) = min
휇퐽∈퐵(휋,훾,휖)
E푦∼휋
[
E퐽∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
E푟∼휇퐽 [푉 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]
Note that 훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖) is decreasing and convex in 휖. Convexity follows from the fact that 휇퐽 ∈
퐵(휋, 훾, 휖) and 휇̃퐽 ∈ 퐵(휋, 훾, 휖̃) implies 휆휇퐽 + (1 − 휆)휇̃퐽 ∈ 퐵(휋, 훾, 휆휖 + (1 − 휆)휖̃). Therefore,
훼푝(휋, 훾, 휆휖 + (1 − 휆)휖̃) ≤ 휆훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖) + (1 − 휆)훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖̃)
Consider any supporting line of 훼푝 at 휖. It is bounded above by 훼푝, by definition. Therefore, its
slope is at most
훼푝(휋, 훾, 0) − 훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖)
휖
≤
1
휖
since 훼푝 is bounded in the unit interval by our regularity assumption. Therefore, the supporting line
will underestimate 훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖 + 휖̃) by at most 휖̃∕휖 and at least zero. This implies our bound. The
argument for 훽푝 is analogous after we observe that it is increasing and concave in 휖.
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E.2.2 Bounds for Misspecified Distributions
The following lemma states that the principal’s worst-case utility 훼푝 is not too sensitive to changes
in the distribution, for any fixed policy 푝.
Lemma 4. For any policy 푝, information structure 훾 , constant 휖 > 0, and distributions 휋, 휋̃, we
have
훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖) ≥ 훼푝(휋̃, 훾, 휖) −
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
− 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
Proof. Note that 퐵(휋, 훾, 휖) ⊆ 퐵(휋̃, 훾, 휖 + 2푑1(휋, 휋̃)) since (1) for any 푟̃퐽 ,
E푦∼휋
[
E퐽∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟̃퐽 , 푝, 푦)
]]
≥ E푦∼휋̃
[
E퐽∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟̃퐽 , 푝, 푦)
]]
− 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
and (2), for any 휇퐽 ,
E푦∼휋
[
E퐽∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
E푟∼휇∗
퐽
[푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]
≤ E푦∼휋̃
[
E퐽∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
E푟∼휇∗
퐽
[푈 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]
+ 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
Therefore,
훼푝(휋, 훾, 휖) ≥ min
휇퐽∈퐵(휋̃,훾,휖+2푑1(휋,휋̃))
E푦∼휋
[
E퐽∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
E푟∼휇퐽 [푉 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]
≥ min
휇퐽∈퐵(휋̃,훾,휖+2푑1(휋,휋̃))
E푦∼휋̃
[
E퐽∼훾(⋅,푦)
[
E푟∼휇퐽 [푉 (푟, 푝, 푦)]
]]
− 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
= 훼푝(휋̃, 훾, 휖 + 2푑1(휋, 휋̃)) − 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
≥ 훼푝(휋̃, 훾, 휖) −
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
− 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
The following lemma states that the 휖-robust policy for a distribution 휋̃ that is near the true
distribution 휋 will perform almost as well as the 휖-robust policy for the true distribution 휋.
Lemma 5. For any 휖 > 0 and distributions 휋, 휋̃, we have
훼푝∗(휋̃,휖)(휋, 휖) ≥ 훼푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 휖) −
4푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
− 2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
Proof. First, observe that
훼푝∗(휋,휖)(휋, 휖) ≤ 훼푝∗(휋,휖)(휋̃, 휖) +
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
+ 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
≤ 훼푝∗(휋̃,휖)(휋̃, 휖) +
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
+ 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
Next, observe that
훼푝∗(휋̃,휖)(휋̃, 휖) ≤ 훼푝∗(휋̃,휖)(휋, 휖) +
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
+ 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
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Collapse these inequalities to obtain the desired result.
The following lemma states that the 휖-informationally-robust policy for a distribution 휋̃ that
is near the true distribution 휋 will provide a similar guarantee against the worst-case information
structure 훾 as the 휖-informationally-robust policy for the true distribution 휋.
Lemma 6. For any 휖 > 0 and distributions 휋, 휋̃, we have
inf
훾
훼푝†(휋,휖)(휋, 훾, 휖) ≤ inf
훾
훼푝†(휋̃,휖)(휋, 훾, 휖) +
4푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
+ 2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
Proof. First, observe that
훼푝†(휋,휖)(휋, 훾, 휖) ≤ 훼푝†(휋,휖)(휋̃, 훾, 휖) +
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
+ 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
which implies
inf
훾
훼푝†(휋,휖)(휋, 훾, 휖) ≤ inf
훾
훼푝†(휋,휖)(휋̃, 훾, 휖) +
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
+ 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
≤ inf
훾
훼푝†(휋̃,휖)(휋̃, 훾, 휖) +
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
+ 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
Next, observe that
훼푝†(휋̃,휖)(휋̃, 훾, 휖) ≤ 훼푝†(휋̃,휖)(휋, 훾, 휖) +
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
+ 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
which implies
inf
훾
훼푝†(휋̃,휖)(휋̃, 훾, 휖) ≤ inf
훾
훼푝†(휋̃,휖)(휋, 훾, 휖) +
2푑1(휋, 휋̃)
휖
+ 푑1(휋, 휋̃)
Collapse these inequalities to obtain the desired result.
E.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Assume access to a forecast 휋푡 ∈ Δ() for every period 푡. We will define this later. In period 푡,
the mechanism computes the policy 푝∗(휋푡, 휖̄) that maximizes the worst-case payoff in the 휖̄-robust
stage game, treating the forecast 휋푡 as the common prior. That is,
푝∗(휋푡, 휖̄) ∈ argmax
푝∈
훼푝(휋푡, 휖̄)
The mechanism chooses 푝푡 as follows. Let 푃 be the unique policy context that includes the policy
푝∗(휋푡, 휖̄) ∈ 푃 . Let 푝푡 = 푝푃 , where 푝푃 ∈ 1 is the representative element of 푃 .
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We will refer to the average regret accumulated in each forecast context 퐹 , i.e.
휖퐹 = max
푟∈
1
푛퐹
∑
푡∈퐹
(
푈 (푟, 푝퐹 , 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝퐹 , 푦푡)
)
where 푝퐹 = 푝푃 for the unique policy context 푃 associated with forecast context 퐹 . We will also
refer to the average regret accumulated in each information context 퐼 ∈ , i.e.
휖퐼 = max
푟∈
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝퐼 , 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝퐼 , 푦푡)
)
where 푝퐼 = 푝퐹 for the unique forecast context 퐹 associated with information 퐼 . Note that
휖퐹 =
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼휖퐼 =
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
max
푟∈
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝퐹 , 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝퐹 , 푦푡)
)
The next two lemmas imply an upper bound on the principal’s regret in terms of the quantity
휄 ≥
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐼)
that measures the discrepancy between the forecast 휋푡 and the empirical distribution 휋̂퐼 conditioned
on the agent’s information 퐼 . Lemma 7 is a lower bound on the principal’s payoff under 휎∗. Lemma
8 is an upper bound on the his payoff under any constant 휎푝 ∈ Σ0.
Lemma 7. Suppose the principal runs 휎∗. Then
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡) ≥ max
푝∈
훼푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
(
휖 + 4휄 +퐾푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−
(
2휄 +퐾푉

훿 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Proof. Let 푟퐼 be a representative element in the response context 푅 associated with information 퐼
under mechanism 휎∗. By regularity,
휖퐼 ≥ max
푟∈
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝퐼 , 푦푡) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦푡)
)
−퐾푈

훿
= max
푟∈
E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푈 (푟, 푝퐼 , 푦) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
−퐾푈

훿
It follows, by regularity and definition of 훼, that
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝퐼 , 푦푡) ≥ E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푉 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
−퐾푉

훿
≥ 훼푝퐼 (휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) −퐾
푉

훿
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Summing over information 퐼 ∈  and using lemma 1, we obtain
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝퐼 , 푦푡) ≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝퐼 (휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) −퐾
푉

훿
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝∗(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿) −퐾
푉

훿 −퐾
푉

훿
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
푡∈퐼
(
훼푝∗(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−퐾푉

훿 −퐾
푉

훿
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝∗(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
(
휖 +퐾푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−퐾푉

훿 −퐾
푉

훿
Focus on the first term, i.e.
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝∗(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) ≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
푡∈퐼
(
훼푝∗(휋̂퐼 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
4푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐼)
휖̄
− 2푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐼)
)
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼훼푝∗(휋̂퐼 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
4휄
휖̄
− 2휄
Collapsing these inequalities gives us the desired bound.
Lemma 8. Suppose the principal runs some constant mechanism 휎푝 ∈ Σ0. Then
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼 max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
(
휖 +퐾푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
Proof. Let 푟퐼 be a representative element in the response context 푅 associated with information 퐼
under 휎푝. By regularity,
휖퐼 ≥ max
푟∈
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝퐼 , 푦푡) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦푡)
)
−퐾푈

훿
= max
푟∈
E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푈 (푟, 푝퐼 , 푦) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
−퐾푈

훿
It follows, by regularity and definition of 훽, that
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤ E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푉 (푟퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]
+퐾푉

훿
≤ 훼푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) +퐾
푉

훿
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Summing over information 퐼 ∈  and using lemma 1, we obtain
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) +퐾
푉

훿
≤
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼
(
훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
≤
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
(
휖 +퐾푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
≤
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼 max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
(
휖 +퐾푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
This is the desired bound.
From these two lemmas, it immediately follows that
PR ≤
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼Δ(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) + 2
(
휖 + 2휄 +퐾푈

훿 +퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+
(
2휄 + 2퐾푉

훿 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Therefore, to bound the principal’s regret, all that remains is to bound 휄.
Set  = 푆 |0|+|1|

where 퐶푡(1) is the vector describing the agent’s response contexts 푅푡 under
policy history 푝∗
1∶푡−1
and policy choices 푝푡 ∈ 1. Note that this is different from the behavior context
that we used to define the agent’s information, which refers to the response context 푅푡 under policy
history 푝∗
1∶푡
. Because we are currently designing the mechanism, we cannot refer to 푝∗
푡
without
attempting to solve a fixed point problem that may not have a solution.
We use the algorithm from appendix ?? to generate 휋푡, with a modification: run it separately
for each context 퐶푡. Adapting equation (8), we obtain
E휎∗
[
1
푇
∑
퐶∈
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹 ,퐶푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶)
]
≤
1
푇
∑
퐶∈
푛퐶
√√√√||| |√2 log | |
푛퐶
+ 2||훿
≤
1
푇
∑
퐶∈
푛
3∕4
퐶
√||| |√2 log | | +√2||훿
≤
1
푇
∑
퐶∈
(
푇||
)3∕4√||| |√2 log | | +√2||훿
=
(||
푇
)1∕4√||| |√2 log | | +√2||훿
where 푛퐹 ,퐶 is the number of periods 푡 where 퐶푡 = 퐶 and 휋푡 ∈ 퐹 .
Consider any two periods 푡, 휏 where 퐼푡 = 퐼휏 but 퐶푡 ≠ 퐶휏 . Since 퐼푡 = 퐼휏 and information
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includes the forecast as context, we know that 휋푡 = 휋휏 . Now, consider
푛퐹푡,퐶푡푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶푡) + 푛퐹휏 ,퐶휏푑1(휋휏 , 휋̂퐶휏 )
= 푛퐹푡,퐶푡푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶푡) + 푛퐹푡,퐶휏푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶휏 )
≥
(
푛퐹푡,퐶푡 + 푛퐹푡,퐶휏
)
푑1
(
휋푡,
1
푛퐹푡,퐶푡 + 푛퐹푡,퐶휏
(
푛퐹푡,퐶푡휋̂퐶푡 + 푛퐹푡,퐶휏푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶휏 )
))
by subadditivity and homogeneity of norms. By continuing this process of combining contexts, we
find
1
푇
∑
퐶∈
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹 ,퐶푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶) ≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐼) = 휄
Therefore, the earlier miscalibration bound applies to E휎∗[휄] as well. Finally, we obtain our bound
on the expected principal’s regret.
E휎∗[PR] ≤
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
푛퐼Δ(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) + 2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
휖 + 2
( ||
푇
)1∕4√||| |√2 log | | + 2√2||훿 +퐾푈훿 +퐾푈 훿
휖̄
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
+
(
2
(||
푇
)1∕4√||| |√2 log | | + 2√2||훿 + 2퐾푉훿 +퐾푉 훿
)
E.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Define
훾̂푃 (퐼, 푦) =
푛퐼 휋̂퐼 (푦)
푛퐹 휋̂퐹 (푦)
⋅ 1(퐼 ∈ 퐹 )
as the empirical information structure conditional on forecast context 퐹 . This definition follows
from Bayes’ rule.
Assume access to a forecast 휋푡 ∈ Δ() for every period 푡. We will define this later. In period 푡,
the mechanism computes the policy 푝∗(휋푡, 휖̄) that maximizes the worst-case payoff in the 휖̄-robust
stage game, treating the forecast 휋푡 as the common prior. That is,
푝∗(휋푡, 휖̄) ∈ argmax
푝∈
훼푝(휋푡, 휖̄)
The mechanism chooses 푝푡 as follows. Let 푃 be the unique policy context that includes the policy
푝∗(휋푡, 휖̄) ∈ 푃 . Let 푝푡 = 푝푃 , where 푝푃 ∈ 1 is the representative element of 푃 .
The next two lemmas imply an upper bound on the principal’s regret in terms of the quantity
휄 ≥
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐹 )
47
that measures the discrepancy between the forecast 휋푡 and the empirical distribution 휋̂퐹 conditioned
on the forecast context 퐹 . Lemma 9 is a lower bound on the principal’s payoff under 휎∗. Lemma
10 is an upper bound on the his payoff under any constant 휎푝 ∈ Σ0.
Lemma 9. Suppose the principal runs the mechanism 휎∗. Then
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푉 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡) ≥
1
푇
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹 max
푝∈
훼푝(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) −
(
휖 + 6휄 +퐾푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−
(
푀1(휖 + 휖̃ + 2휄 + 2퐾
푈

훿 ) +푀2 + 3휄 +퐾
푉

훿 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Proof. Let 푟퐼 be a representative element in the response context 푅 associated with information 퐼
under mechanism 휎∗. By regularity,
휖퐼 ≥ max
푟∈
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝퐼 , 푦푡) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦푡)
)
−퐾푈

훿
= max
푟∈
E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푈 (푟, 푝퐼 , 푦) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
−퐾푈

훿
It follows, by regularity and definition of 훼, that
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝퐼 , 푦푡) ≥ E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푉 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
−퐾푉

훿
≥ 훼푝퐼 (휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) −퐾
푉

훿
Summing over information 퐼 ∈ 퐹 and using lemma 1, we obtain
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝퐹 , 푦푡) ≥
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝퐹 (휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) −퐾
푉

훿
≥
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝∗(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿 ) −퐾
푉

훿 −퐾
푉

훿
≥
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
(
훼푝∗(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−퐾푉

훿 −퐾
푉

훿
=
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝∗(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
(
휖퐹 +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−퐾푉

훿 −퐾
푉

훿
So far, we have a lower bound for the principal’s payoff that nearly matches the principal’s worst-
case payoff in the stage game if the agent had information structure 훾̂퐹 in each forecast context.
Furthermore, we know that this information structure cannot be particularly useful to the agent.
Define
−휖̃퐹 = max
푟∈
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝퐹 , 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝퐹 , 푦푡)
)
as the (possibly negative) regret accumulated in forecast context 퐹 relative to the best-in-hindsight
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response, rather than the best-in-hindsight function from information to responses. Let 휋퐹 be the
forecast associated with forecast context 퐹 . Note that
휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 = min
푟̃∈
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
max
푟∈
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝퐹 , 푦푡) − 푈 (푟̃, 푝퐹 , 푦푡)
)
≥ min
푟̃∈
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
max
푟∈
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝∗(휋퐹 , 휖̄), 푦푡) − 푈 (푟̃, 푝
∗(휋퐹 , 휖̄), 푦푡)
)
− 2퐾푈

훿
= min
푟
max
푟퐽
E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂퐹 (⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟퐽 , 푝
∗(휋퐹 , 휖̄), 푦) − 푈 (푟, 푝
∗(휋퐹 , 휖̄), 푦)
]]
− 2퐾푈

훿
≥ min
푟
max
푟퐽
E푦∼휋퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂퐹 (⋅,푦)
[
푈 (푟퐽 , 푝
∗(휋퐹 , 휖̄), 푦) − 푈 (푟, 푝
∗(휋퐹 , 휖̄), 푦)
]]
− 2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) − 2퐾
푈

훿
It follows from assumption 9 that
푀1(휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 + 2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) + 2퐾
푈

훿 ) +푀2 ≥ 훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋퐹 , 휖̄) − 훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄)
which can be rewritten as
훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄) ≥ 훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋퐹 , 휖̄) −
(
푀1(휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 + 2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) + 2퐾
푈

훿 ) +푀2
)
(9)
Next, we relate our lower bound on the principal’s payoff to the term 훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄). Note that
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) = E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂(⋅,푦)
[
훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 ∣퐽 , 휖̄)
]]
≥ min
푒퐽
E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂(⋅,푦)
[
훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋퐹 ∣퐽 , 푒퐽 )
]]
s.t. 휖̄ = E푦∼휋퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂⋅,푦
[
푒퐽
]]
= 훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄)
≥ 훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄) −
2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 )
휖̄
− 푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 )
So combining this with inequality (9) gives
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄)
≥ 훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋퐹 , 휖̄) −
(
푀1(휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 + 2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) + 2퐾
푈

훿) +푀2
)
−
(
2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 )
휖̄
)
− 푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 )
≥ 훼푝∗(휋̂퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) −
(
푀1(휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 + 2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) + 2퐾
푈

훿) +푀2
)
−
(
6푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 )
휖̄
)
− 3푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 )
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Collapsing these inequalities gives us
1
푛퐹
∑
푡∈퐹
푉 (푟푡, 푝퐹 , 푦푡) ≥훼푝∗(휋̂퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) −
(
휖퐹 + 6푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−
(
푀1(휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 + 2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) + 2퐾
푈

훿 ) +푀2 + 3푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) +퐾
푉

훿 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Summing over forecast contexts 퐹 ∈  gives us the desired result.
Lemma 10. Suppose the principal runs some constant mechanism 휎푝 ∈ Σ0. Then
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤
1
푇
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹 max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) +
(
휖 +퐾푈

훿
휖̄
)
+
(
푀1(휖 + 휖̃) +푀2 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Proof. Let 푟퐼 be a representative element in the response context 푅 associated with information 퐼
under mechanism 휎푝. By regularity,
휖퐼 ≥ max
푟∈
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝, 푦푡)
)
−퐾푈

훿
= max
푟∈
E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푈 (푟, 푝, 푦) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]
−퐾푈

훿
It follows, by regularity and definition of 훽, that
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤ E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푉 (푟퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]
+퐾푉

훿
≤ 훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) +퐾
푉

훿
Summing over information 퐼 ∈ 퐹 and using lemma 1, we obtain
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) +퐾
푉

훿
≤
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼
(
훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
=
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
(
휖퐹 +퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
So far, we have an upper bound for the principal’s payoff that nearly matches the principal’s worst-
case payoff in the stage game if the agent had information structure 훾̂퐹 in each forecast context.
Furthermore, we know that this information structure cannot be particularly useful to the agent.
Define
−휖̃퐹 = max
푟∈
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡)
)
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as the (possibly negative) regret accumulated in forecast context 퐹 relative to the best-in-hindsight
response, rather than the best-in-hindsight function from information to responses. Let 휋퐹 be the
forecast associated with forecast context 퐹 . Note that
휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 = min
푟̃∈
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
max
푟∈
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟̃, 푝, 푦푡)
)
It follows from assumption 9 that
푀1(휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 ) +푀2 ≥ 훽푝(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄) − max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄)
which can be rewritten as
훽푝(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄) ≤ max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃ +푀1(휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 ) +푀2
Next, we relate our upper bound on the principal’s payoff to the term 훽푝(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄). Note that
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) = E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂(⋅,푦)
[
훽푝(휋̂퐹 ∣퐽 , 휖̄)
]]
≤ max
푒퐽
E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂(⋅,푦)
[
훽푝(휋퐹 ∣퐽 , 푒퐽 )
]]
s.t. 휖̄ = E푦∼휋퐹
[
E퐽∼ ̂⋅,푦
[
푒퐽
]]
= 훽푝(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄)
Collapsing these inequalities gives us
1
푛퐹
∑
푡∈퐹
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤ max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) +
(
휖퐹 +퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+
(
푀1(휖퐹 + 휖̃퐹 ) +푀2 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Summing over forecast contexts 퐹 ∈  gives us the desired result.
From these two lemmas, it immediately follows that
PR ≤
1
푇
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹Δ(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) +
(
2휖 + 6휄 + 2퐾푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+
(
푀1(2휖 + 2휖̃ + 2휄 + 2퐾
푈

훿) + 2푀2 + 3휄 + 2퐾
푉

훿 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Therefore, to bound the principal’s regret, all that remains is to bound 휄. If we use the algorithm
from appendix ?? to generate 휋푡, this follows directly from equation (8), which states
E휎∗[휄] ≤
√
||| |√2 log | |
푇
+ 2||훿
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Finally, we obtain our bound on the expected principal’s regret.
E휎∗[PR] ≤
1
푇
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹Δ(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) +
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2휖 + 6
√||| |√2 log | |
푇
+ 2||훿 + 2퐾푈훿 + 2퐾푈 훿
휖̄
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+푀1
⎛⎜⎜⎝2휖 + 2휖̃ + 2
√
||| |√2 log | |
푇
+ 2||훿 + 2퐾푈 훿⎞⎟⎟⎠
+ 2푀2 + 3
√
||| |√2 log | |
푇
+ 2||훿 + 2퐾푉훿 +퐾푉 훿
E.5 Proof of Theorem 6
Assume access to a forecast 휋푡 for every period 푡. We will define this later. The mechanism chooses
푝푡 as follows. Let 푃 be the unique policy context that includes the policy 푝
†(휋푡, 휖̄) ∈ 푃 . Let 푝푡 = 푝푃 ,
where 푝푃 ∈ 1 is the representative element of 푃 .
The next two lemmas imply an upper bound on the principal’s regret in terms of the quantity
휄 ≥
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐹 )
that measures the discrepancy between the forecast 휋푡 and the empirical distribution 휋̂퐹 conditioned
on the forecast context 퐹 . Lemma 11 is a lower bound on the principal’s payoff under 휎∗. Lemma
12 is an upper bound on the his payoff under any constant 휎푝 ∈ Σ0.
Lemma 11. Suppose the principal runs the mechanism 휎∗. Then
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푉 (푟푡, 푝푡, 푦푡) ≥
1
푇
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹 inf
훾
max
푝∈
훼푝(휋̂퐹 , 훾, 휖̄) −
(
휖 + 4휄 +퐾푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−
(
2휄 +퐾푉

훿 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Proof. Let 푟퐼 be a representative element in the response context 푅 associated with information 퐼
under mechanism 휎∗. By regularity,
휖퐼 ≥ max
푟∈
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝퐼 , 푦푡) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦푡)
)
−퐾푈

훿
= max
푟∈
E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푈 (푟, 푝퐼 , 푦) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
−퐾푈

훿
52
It follows, by regularity and definition of 훼, that
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝퐼 , 푦푡) ≥ E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푉 (푟퐼 , 푝퐼 , 푦)
]
−퐾푉

훿
≥ 훼푝퐼 (휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) −퐾
푉

훿
Summing over information 퐼 ∈ 퐹 , we obtain
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝퐹 , 푦푡) ≥
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝퐹 (휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) −퐾
푉

훿
≥
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝†(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿 ) −퐾
푉

훿 −퐾
푉

훿
≥
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
(
훼푝†(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−퐾푉

훿 −퐾
푉

훿
=
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
훼푝†(휋푡,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
(
휖퐹 +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−퐾푉

훿 −퐾
푉

훿
Focus on the first term, i.e.
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼훼푝†(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) = E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂(⋅,푦)
[
훼푝†(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 ∣퐽 , 휖̄)
]]
≥ min
푒퐽
E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂(⋅,푦)
[
훼푝†(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 ∣퐽 , 푒퐽 )
]]
s.t. 휖̄ = E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂⋅,푦
[
푒퐽
]]
= 훼푝†(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄)
≥ inf
훾
훼푝†(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 , 훾, 휖̄)
≥ inf
훾
훼푝†(휋̂퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 , 훾, 휖̄) −
4푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 )
휖̄
− 2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 )
Collapsing these inequalities gives us
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝퐹 , 푦푡) ≥ inf
훾
훼푝†(휋̂퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐹 , 훾, 휖̄) −
(
휖퐹 + 4푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) +퐾
푈

훿 + 2퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
−
(
2푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) +퐾
푉

훿 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Summing over forecast contexts 퐹 ∈  gives us the desired result.
Lemma 12. Suppose the principal runs some constant mechanism 휎푝 ∈ Σ0. Then
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹 max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄) +
(
휖 +퐾푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
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Proof. Let 푟퐼 be a representative element in the response context 푅 associated with information 퐼
under mechanism 휎푝. By regularity,
휖퐼 ≥ max
푟∈
∑
푡∈퐼
(
푈 (푟, 푝, 푦푡) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝, 푦푡)
)
−퐾푈

훿
= max
푟∈
E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푈 (푟, 푝, 푦) − 푈 (푟퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]
−퐾푈

훿
It follows, by regularity and definition of 훽, that
1
푛퐼
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤ E푦∼휋̂퐼
[
푉 (푟퐼 , 푝, 푦)
]
+퐾푉

훿
≤ 훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) +퐾
푉

훿
Summing over information 퐼 ∈ 퐹 , we obtain
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿) +퐾
푉

훿
≤
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼
(
훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
휖퐼 +퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
=
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) +
(
휖퐹 +퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
Focus on the first term, i.e.
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
푛퐼훽푝(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) = E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂(⋅,푦)
[
훽푝(휋̂퐹 ∣퐽 , 휖̄)
]]
≤ max
푒퐽
E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂(⋅,푦)
[
훽푝(휋̂퐹 ∣퐽 , 푒퐽 )
]]
s.t. 휖̄ = E푦∼휋̂퐹
[
E퐽∼훾̂⋅,푦
[
푒퐽
]]
= 훽푝(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄)
≤ max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄)
Collapsing these inequalities gives us
1
푛퐹
∑
퐼∈퐹
∑
푡∈퐼
푉 (푟푡, 푝, 푦푡) ≤ max
푝̃∈
훽푝̃(휋̂퐹 , 훾̂퐹 , 휖̄) +
(
휖퐹 +퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+퐾푉

훿
Summing over forecast contexts 퐹 ∈  gives us the desired result.
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From these two lemmas, it immediately follows that
PR ≤
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹∇(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) + 2
(
휖 + 2휄 +퐾푈

훿 +퐾
푈

훿
휖̄
)
+
(
2휄 + 2퐾푉

훿 +퐾
푉

훿
)
Therefore, to bound the principal’s regret, all that remains is to bound 휄. If we use the algorithm
from appendix ?? to generate 휋푡, this follows directly from equation (8), which states
E휎∗[휄] ≤
√
||| |√2 log | |
푇
+ 2||훿
Finally, we obtain our bound on the expected principal’s regret.
E휎∗[PR] ≤
1
푇
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹∇(휋̂퐹 , 휖̄) + 2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
휖 + 2
√||| |√2 log | |
푇
+ 2||훿 +퐾푈훿 +퐾푈 훿
휖̄
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+
⎛⎜⎜⎝2
√
||| |√2 log | |
푇
+ 2||훿 + 2퐾푉훿 +퐾푉 훿⎞⎟⎟⎠
E.6 Proof of Theorem 1
We adapt the proof of theorem 4 to prove theorem 1. This will require only relativelyminor changes.
Let 휋̂퐼,퐹 denote the empirical distribution among periods 푡 ∈ 퐼 ∩퐹 . Let 푛퐼,퐹 indicate the number of
such periods. Let 휋퐹 denote the (unique) forecast associated with forecast context 퐹 . Previously,
we defined
휄 ≥
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐼)
Now, we define
휄 ≥
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐼,퐹 )
Begin at the last line of lemma 7, where it says “focus on the first term”. Rewrite that first term as
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐼∩퐹
훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄)
Now we switch 휋̂퐼 with 휋퐼 , i.e. the convex combination of forecasts,
휋퐼 =
1
푛퐼
∑
퐹∈
푛퐼,퐹휋퐹
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By lemma 4, this gives us
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐼∩퐹
훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄)
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐼∩퐹
(
훼푝∗(휋퐹 ,휖̄)(휋퐼 , 휖̄) −
2푑1(휋퐼 , 휋̂퐼)
휖̄
− 푑1(휋퐼 , 휋̂퐼)
)
Note that every forecast 휋퐹 leads to a policy 푝
∗(휋퐹 , 휖̄) that is in the policy context 푃 associated with
information 퐼 . By assumption ??,
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐼∩퐹
(
훼푝∗(휋퐼 ,휖̄)(휋퐼 , 휖̄) −
2푑1(휋퐼 , 휋̂퐼)
휖̄
− 푑1(휋퐼 , 휋̂퐼) − 푂(훿)
)
Now we apply lemma 4 again,
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐼∩퐹
(
훼푝∗(휋퐼 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
4푑1(휋퐼 , 휋̂퐼)
휖̄
− 2푑1(휋퐼 , 휋̂퐼) − 푂(훿)
)
and then lemma 5
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐼∩퐹
(
훼푝∗(휋̂퐼 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
8푑1(휋퐼 , 휋̂퐼)
휖̄
− 4푑1(휋퐼 , 휋̂퐼) − 푂(훿)
)
By the homogeneity and subadditivity of the 푙1 norm,
푑1(휋퐼 , 휋̂퐼) ≤
1
푛퐼
푛∑
푖=1
푛퐼,퐹푑1(휋퐼,퐹 , 휋̂퐼,퐹 )
which gives us
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐼∩퐹
(
훼푝∗(휋̂퐼 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄) −
8푑1(휋퐼,퐹 , 휋̂퐼,퐹 )
휖̄
− 4푑1(휋퐼,퐹 , 휋̂퐼,퐹 ) −푂(훿 )
)
≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐼∩퐹
(
훼푝∗(휋̂퐼 ,휖̄)(휋̂퐼 , 휖̄)
)
−
8휄
휖̄
− 4휄 −푂(훿 )
This is essentially where we were by the end of lemma 7, with the addition of an 푂(훿 ) term and
slightly different constants.
Lemma 8 requires no change. The discussion following lemma 8 requires very little change.
Find the line that begins with “Consider any two periods”. We rewrite as follows. Consider any
two periods 푡, 휏 where 퐼푡 = 퐼휏 and 퐹푡 = 퐹휏 but 퐶푡 ≠ 퐶휏 . Since 퐹푡 = 퐹휏 we know that 휋푡 = 휋휏 .
Now, consider
푛퐹푡,퐶푡푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶푡) + 푛퐹휏 ,퐶휏푑1(휋휏 , 휋̂퐶휏 )
= 푛퐹푡,퐶푡푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶푡) + 푛퐹푡,퐶휏푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶휏 )
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≥
(
푛퐹푡,퐶푡 + 푛퐹푡,퐶휏
)
푑1
(
휋푡,
1
푛퐹푡,퐶푡 + 푛퐹푡,퐶휏
(
푛퐹푡,퐶푡휋̂퐶푡 + 푛퐹푡,퐶휏푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶휏 )
))
by subadditivity and homogeneity of norms. By continuing this process of combining contexts, we
find
1
푇
∑
퐶∈
∑
퐹∈
푛퐹 ,퐶푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐶) ≥
1
푇
∑
퐼∈
∑
퐹∈
푛퐼,퐹푑1(휋푡, 휋̂퐼,퐹 ) = 휄
Therefore, our bound holds except with the addition of an 푂(훿 ) term and slightly different con-
stants.
E.7 Proof of Theorem 2
Define
휋푃 =
1
푛푃
∑
퐹∈
푛푃 ,퐹휋퐹
It is straightforward to adapt the proof of theorem 5. Replace all reference to 푝∗(휋퐹 , 휖̄)with 푝
∗(휋푃 , 휖̄).
This changes 푈 and 푉 (and all derived terms, like 훼) by at most푂(훿), by assumption ??. Replace
all remaining references of forecast contexts 퐹 to policy contexts 푃 . It remains to verify that
휄 ≥
1
푇
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐹
푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) ≥
1
푇
∑
푃∈
∑
푡∈퐹
푑1(휋푃 , 휋̂푃 )
which follows from the homogeneity and subadditivity of the 푙1 norm, and the fact that 휋푃 , 휋̂푃 are
convex combinations of 휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 for 퐹 ⊆ 푃 .
E.8 Proof of Theorem 3
Define
휋푃 =
1
푛푃
∑
퐹∈
푛푃 ,퐹휋퐹
It is straightforward to adapt the proof of theorem6. Replace all reference to 푝†(휋퐹 , 휖̄)with 푝
†(휋푃 , 휖̄).
This changes 푈 and 푉 (and all derived terms, like 훼) by at most푂(훿), by assumption ??. Replace
all remaining references of forecast contexts 퐹 to policy contexts 푃 . It remains to verify that
휄 ≥
1
푇
∑
퐹∈
∑
푡∈퐹
푑1(휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 ) ≥
1
푇
∑
푃∈
∑
푡∈퐹
푑1(휋푃 , 휋̂푃 )
which follows from the homogeneity and subadditivity of the 푙1 norm, and the fact that 휋푃 , 휋̂푃 are
convex combinations of 휋퐹 , 휋̂퐹 for 퐹 ⊆ 푃 .
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